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ALLIED INTRIGUE IN THE LOW COUNTRIES

FULL TEXT OF WHITE BOOK No. 5
PUBLISHED BY
THE GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE

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ALLIED INTRIGUE
IN THE
LOW COUNTRIES

Germany. Auswärtiges Amt.

ALLIED INTRIGUE IN THE LOW COUNTRIES

*FURTHER DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE
ANGLO-FRENCH POLICY OF EXTENDING
THE WAR*

FULL TEXT OF WHITE BOOK No. 5
PUBLISHED BY
THE GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE

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PREFATORY NOTE TO THE AMERICAN EDITION

White Book No. 5, entitled *Further Documents Concerning the Anglo-French Policy of Extending the War*, was issued in German and in English by the Foreign Office in Berlin. Owing to the blockade of the mails imposed by Great Britain in violation of international law, neither edition is available in the United States. The present edition, prepared for the benefit of historical students in America, is an authorized translation of the German original and a faithful reproduction in facsimile of documents which fell into the hands of the German troops in their swift advance through Holland and Belgium. It includes in addition the statement of the German General Staff of May 4, 1940, and the German Memorandum to the Dutch and Belgian Governments of May 10, 1940. The evidence presented in the White Book itself corroborates and supplements the allegations of the German Government and the General Staff.

Long before the actual invasion, comprehensive investigations by the General Staff had revealed the connivance of Dutch and Belgian Government authorities with Allied espionage centers and the Allied High Command. The object of the conspiracy was the overthrow of the German Government and the perpetuation of the intolerable condition existing on the Continent due to the incessant interferences of Great Britain. Observations on German troop movements, military maps and secret data circulated freely between military authorities of the Lowlands and the Anglo-French Allies.

These intrigues had been going on, in one form or another, for a considerable time. Finally the day came when England advised the Belgian and Dutch Governments to expect the immediate landing of British troops on their territory in accordance with the prearranged plan. But the German High Command was not asleep. The day after the advices in question were received, German armed forces entered the Lowlands and occupied the vital points through which the Allies intended to make their thrust. Joachim von Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister, in a statement to the press, explained the action taken by the German Government to protect its own interests and the neutrality of the Low Countries.

"The German Government," the Foreign Minister announced, "has directed a Memorandum to the Royal Dutch and the Royal Belgian Governments in which the German Government asserts that it is in possession of evidence and news which carry incontrovertible proof that an Anglo-French attack on Germany is immediately imminent and that this attack will take place against the Ruhr over Belgium and the Netherlands.

"Therefore, the command has been given German troops to insure the neutrality of these countries with all the Reich's military means of power.

"Another memorandum has been sent to the Luxemburg Government by the German Government.

"The German Government sets forth therein that it is reliably informed that England and France, in pursuit of their policy of extension of the war, decided to attack in the near future by way of Belgium and Holland."

Herr von Ribbentrop then recapitulated the substance of the identical notes to the two governments.

When the German troops actually occupied the Lowlands, they proceeded with such speed that it was impossible for enemy forces to destroy all damning evidence. The documents found fully justified the German action and yielded many additional clues. It is now clear beyond doubt or cavil why British violations of Dutch and Belgian sovereignty were either ignored or evoked only the gentlest of protests. It is also clear why both countries concentrated troops and fortified strategic positions in the territory facing Germany, while leaving almost unprotected the approaches from England and France. If Belgium and Holland had been truly neutral, they would not have confined their negotiations to the British and French, but would have effectually safeguarded their countries by simultaneous consultations with the German General Staff providing for the contingency of an Allied attack.

British, French and Belgian military orders, discovered by the German Army of Occupation and supported by testimony from many witnesses, demonstrate the success of the plot of the Western Powers to enlist the aid of the Low Countries for their contemplated attack upon the Ruhr Valley. Even tiny Luxemburg played a part in the Allied design.

The orders published in the ensuing pages were issued by the Allies between November, 1939, and April, 1940. Several of the papers contain detailed information for establishing connections between Anglo-French troops and the Belgians. Others call for Belgian petroleum for French motorized units. Timetables for transporting French troops had been carefully prepared. Officers were advised to complete the study of Belgian roads

along which the advance was to proceed by the end of February. French staff members were inspecting Belgian dispositions. Some Allied forces were on Belgian soil even before May 10.

The Summary of the White Book forcibly brings out two points of vital importance:

(1) In spite of pretensions of neutrality on the part of Belgium, discussions between the French and the Belgian General Staff had never ceased since the World War and there never was a complete lapse in Anglo-Belgian military relations. Irrefutable documents had convinced the German High Command of these facts, which poisoned the relations between the two countries, long before Belgian Government officials openly flaunted their military commitments to the Allies.

(2) The documents discovered by the German troops on their advance through Belgium and Holland, conclusively prove that after September, 1939, combined Allied and Lowland General Staffs had prepared to the minutest detail an Anglo-French attack on the Ruhr through the Lowlands. Fighting units had been apprized of these plans long before May 10, when Germany nipped the conspiracy in the bud.

To anyone familiar with the web woven by British diplomacy and British espionage, there is nothing surprising in these revelations. Allied plans to extend the war were pursued simultaneously in every corner of Europe and in Asia Minor; from Scandinavia to Turkey, from Holland and Belgium to Rumania and the Caucasus. British plans included designs to inveigle Italy and Russia. Some of these plans have been exposed in previous White Books. Still others will be revealed in White Book No. 6, which is based, in the main, on the secret minutes of the Allied High Command. The Allies were eager to set the whole world on fire, with utter disregard for neutral states and the remnants of international law which still govern the relations between belligerents.

The specious aid for Finland proposed by the Allies failed to entice new belligerents. Sabotage plots in Rumania and in the Caucasus were exposed and prevented before much material damage was done. The Norwegian misadventure ended in a British debacle. In this perplexity, the Allies recalled their pleasant arrangement with Holland and Belgium. But the Führer, striking with the rapidity of lightning, frustrated their scheme to stab the industrial heart of the Reich by invading the Ruhr. Germany acted in time and the Allies once more, in the phrase immortalized by Mr. Chamberlain, "missed the bus."

SUMMARY

The secret plans of the Western Powers to extend the war to the smaller neutral countries were exposed to the public for the first time on April 14, 1940, by the German Foreign Minister, in his address to the Diplomatic Corps and the domestic and foreign press in Berlin.

On the very day of the German Minister's revelations, Norway was being prepared as a theater of war through Britain's long laid schemes. But the well-conceived policy of the Western Powers was not limited to this Norwegian adventure, because not much later—early in May, 1940—the German Government heard of Franco-British plans for an advance into the German industrial district of the Ruhr. This advance was to be made possible through the connivance and cooperation of Holland and Belgium. Preludes to this move were the threatening notes and speeches the Allies directed to neutral countries, particularly Holland and Belgium. The Western Powers found in the rulers of these countries and their political organs, willing tools to carry out this policy of invasion and attack.

On May 10, 1940, the Memorandum addressed to the Belgian and Dutch Governments was published by the German Government, together with a report from the High Army Command.¹ *This report furnished documentary evidence of General Staff conversations between Britain and France on the one hand and Belgium and Holland on the other hand.* The primary object of these conversations among the General Staffs of the aforementioned countries was to perfect plans for an Allied advance across Belgium, Dutch and Luxemburg territory into the German Ruhr district.

Obviously these conversations of world-shaking import were held in secrecy and, as obviously, they were never intended to become general knowledge. But even high military secrets have a way of leaking out. As far back as March 6, 1936, as was later disclosed, the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the French Ambassador to that country stationed in Brussels, confirmed that their respective governments were determined to

¹ Although not a part of the official *White Book No. 5*, the Memorandum and the Statement of the General Staff have been inserted after the Summary for the benefit of the American reader.

maintain the letter and the spirit of the old Franco-Belgian Military Alliance, i.e. contact between the two General Staffs.²

Early in 1939, when the British policy of war against Germany was already being actively pursued, consultations were held in the Belgian Senate Committee for Foreign Affairs in which military contacts between Belgium and Britain and France were discussed in great detail. In the early part of 1940 no effort was made to deny that these secret General Staff conversations were taking place. Thus, on February 7, the Belgian War Minister declared that "no factor had been left unaccounted for by responsible Belgian authorities to enable the Powers guaranteeing the independence of Belgium to fulfill the obligations which they have solemnly undertaken." These guarantor powers were Germany, Britain and France.

² The note transmitted by the Belgian Foreign Ministry of that time, dated March 6, 1936, reads as follows:

To His Excellency Monsieur van Zeeland, Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and Minister for Foreign Trade.

Your Excellency,

By the exchange of correspondence of September 10 and 15, 1920, between the French Prime Minister and Foreign Minister and the Belgian Prime Minister, the French Government and the Government of His Majesty the King of the Belgians gave their assent to the military agreement signed on September 7, 1920. According to the wording of the correspondence which passed between the two Governments in 1920 and was recorded in Geneva, the object of the agreement of 1920 was to reinforce the guarantees of peace and security resulting from the League of Nations Pact. The agreement establishes the technical directives for military cooperation between France and Belgium in the event of an unprovoked attack by Germany.

In 1925 a treaty was concluded at Locarno which embodied the guarantees provided for in 1920 in a more complete and precise form. The treaty was signed by the President of the Republic and received the assent of the Chambers.

This treaty represents one of the most essential elements of Belgium's international status, and the obligations therein laid down, together with the obligations resulting from the Pact of the League of Nations, are the only ones which bind France and Belgium in respect of guarantees and assistance.

It is self-evident that the two Governments are more than ever determined to remain true to these obligations.

As far as military matters are concerned, the agreement of 1920 contains, in addition to general arrangements relative to contact between the General Staffs, special measures in regard to a common occupation of the left bank of the Rhine.

The two Governments, who clearly understand what portions of this agreement are no longer of current importance, have recognized the value of retaining only the one clause which holds good today, namely the understanding existing between them—which they now desire to confirm—relative to the continuance of General Staff contacts both for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the Locarno-Rhineland Treaty and also of studying the technical conditions connected with a possible application of the said undertakings.

It remains agreed that military contacts of this nature cannot involve, for either of the parties to the treaty, any political obligation nor any undertaking relative to the organization of national defense.

I have the honor to confirm to Your Excellency that the above carries the assent of the French Government.

I take this opportunity of again assuring Your Excellency of my high esteem.

(signed) Laroche.

However, since Germany had never been approached by Belgium in regard to General Staff agreements, the guarantor powers referred to by the Belgian War Minister consisted of Britain and France exclusively. The following day, February 8, 1940, brought a further confirmation of this Belgian policy. When Grammens, a Deputy of the Belgian Chamber, demanded that fortifications also be erected along the southern frontier of Belgium, he was immediately interrupted by the War Minister and the Speaker on the grounds that "he should say nothing which might be prejudicial to the defense of the country or could be interpreted in a malevolent sense." Briefly, the Belgian General Staff, in its efforts to avoid exposing its one-sided military policy against Germany, exercised great care to conceal from the world at large that Belgium had erected fortifications only along the German border.

The Army High Command report attached to the German Memorandum has already adduced a number of individual facts showing that this Belgian policy directed solely against Germany had in all respects been pursued for some time. Further proof of this is furnished by a 1937 decree of the Belgian War Ministry relating to the evacuation of civilians.³

³ The decree reads as follows:

[Translation]

Ministry of National Defense
Territorial Civil Guard

Confidential

5.Div.S.S.P.A.P.
No.1889/57.7.37.C.M.
Attached: 1 map
E.M.

Evacuation of the Civilian Population

- Art. I. Women, children, invalids and the aged will be conducted by the Territorial Civil Guard in conjunction with local Red Cross formations.
- Art. II. In deciding upon the route to be taken, the instructions issued by Army General H. Q. as information is received will be strictly observed.
- Art. III. None of the main roads or approach roads marked on the accompanying plans are to be used for the purpose of evacuation.
- (Art. IV to XV contain technical details in regard to carrying out the evacuation.)

Certified correct copy
Transmitted by order
(signed) Lt.-General Termonia.

(The ministerial decree includes the following supplementary instructions.)

Our extract from the map:

The following are reserved for the British Army:

Furnes to Ostend,

Furnes to Bruges via Ghistelles,

Furnes to Dixmude,

Railway line from Adinkerke to Thielt and Ghent—Adinkerke to Dixmude, Thourout and Bruges,

This decree was a comprehensive plan for evacuating women, children, old people and invalids, etc., from those areas regarded as the scene of future military operations. Characteristic of the plans for a concentration of the Belgo-Franco-British Armies is a note in this decree stating that certain roads and approach-roads should not be employed for the evacuation because they were "reserved for the British Army." From this it will be seen that the area on which the British Army was to deploy had been decided upon in all details between the General Staffs, and these plans were brought to the attention of the local Belgian authorities to enable them to carry out measures of organization.

There is therefore no doubt that General Staff arrangements were made years ago between Belgium and France and Britain—and also with Holland.

Due to the rapid advance of the German troops, a vast quantity of fresh evidence has fallen into German hands. This evidence, consisting of orders, service instructions, maps, etc., affords clear proof that not only were General Staff agreements reached between the High Command of France, Britain, Belgium and Holland, but, on the basis of these agreements, orders for all military units were drawn up and handed out to them for study.

The evidence proves beyond doubt that the whole advance of the Franco-Belgian Army was planned on the basis of intimate cooperation with the Belgian General Staff. From the wealth of material at its disposal, the German Foreign Office herewith publishes, as a preliminary example, a few documents, to reveal in detail the concentration of a portion of the vanguard

Road, from Proven to Poperinghe and Ypres, Hooglede, Thourout, Bruges,
 Menen to Courtrai and Ghent,
 Aelbeke to Courtrai and Ghent,
 Tournai to Courtrai and Ghent,
 Roulers, Thourout, Bruges,
 Roulers, Thielt, Aeltre, Ecclos,
 Courtrai, Deinze, Ghent,
 Tournai, Antoing,
 Tournai, Leuze and Baisieux to Ath, Enghien, Brussels,
 Tournai, Haequeies, Renaix, Audenarde to Ghent,
 Tournai, Lessines, Crammont, Ninove, Brussels,
 Renaix, Ninove via Nederbrakel,
 Leuze, Ath, Enghien, Brussels,
 Peruwelz to Mons,
 Mons to Ath,
 Mons to Brussels,
 Road from La Louvière to Brussels via Nivelles,
 Road from Charleroi to Nivelles, to Waterloo, Terveuren, Nosseghem and Louvain,
 Charleroi to Nivelles.

All high roads from La Louvière, Charleroi, Namur and Dinant in the direction of the French frontier are military roads when they allow for traffic in both directions regardless of whether they are asphalted or paved; only narrow roads are free for evacuation.

of the French and British Armies and to disclose what plans were made for its cooperation with the Belgian, Dutch and British armies.

Document No. 1

This document shows that the plans of operation made by the British and French General Staffs from the very outset included the territory of Luxemburg. It deals with the orders issued by the Commander of a French force detailed for operations in Luxemburg. These orders, dated May 2, 1940, contain a modification of previous instructions which were to have been followed upon receipt of the obviously anticipated command: "Enter Luxemburg immediately."

Document No. 2

This is a Regimental Order, dated April 2, 1940, which orders the 4th French Cavalry Reconnaissance Car Regiment to proceed to the Meuse on the first day of the invasion, and instructs its advance detachments to reach the Belgian village of Marche, as well as Durbuy, 30 km south of Liège. The order further contains exact details of the manner in which the regiment is to establish contact with the French units advancing in the neighboring territories as well as with the Belgian troops in the fortified region of Namur. The direction of sudden advance prescribed for this regiment is to extend south of the Meuse, once the Meuse is crossed between Namur and Dinant. The division to which this regiment belongs was thus assigned the task of reaching the German frontier near Aix-la-Chapelle.

Document No. 3

This reveals in full detail how far the preparation for the entry of Franco-British troops into Belgium had already advanced. This order, issued by the 4th French Light Division mentioned in Document No. 2, deals with the reinforcement of the troops during the first days of the advance. Typical of the exactitude of the Belgian-French agreements, orders were issued even for the supply of petrol to the French army from Belgian petrol stations and for the manner and method of payment. Thus the order of the 4th Light Division states literally that vouchers, specially prepared for the entry and provided with the stamp "French Army," would be valid for the Belgian civilian as well as for the army gas stations. Paragraph 5 of this Divisional Order affords further proof of the agreements reached between the two General Staffs, since it clearly shows that motorized units

were to be detrained at Belgian stations on the very first day of the advance of French troops into Belgium.

Document No. 4

Document No. 4 is an order issued by the French High Command on April 16, 1940, which likewise shows that the use of the Belgian railway system was provided for in the advance into Belgium and that an extensive plan was already prepared for this purpose. This order was found among the divisional papers, together with the instructions, also printed here, for the entrainment of the 21st French Infantry Division. In these instructions for entrainment, as well as in a written note attached to them, entrainment stations situated south of Dunkerque not far from the Belgian frontier are clearly indicated for the individual units of the above named division, as well as the exact times of departure and the destinations lying to the west of Antwerp. This proves that a timetable drawn up with exact details had been prepared for the railway transport of French troops to Belgium, all of which clearly indicates close cooperation with the Belgian railway administration.

Document No. 5

In this Document, there is particularly striking proof of most minute preparations for the French advance into Belgium. It shows that special sketches had been issued for the routes of advance on Belgian territory and that these were to be duplicated by the squadrons. This was to ensure that every independent subordinate commander down to the lance-corporal memorize exactly the routes of advance into Belgium. This measure was to be carried through by February 8, 1940.

Document No. 6

From the sixth document, it is evident that this reconnoitering of Belgian territory was not only being done on the map but that the French officers, as the German General Staff had known for a long time, considered it a matter of course that they should be entitled to visit Belgian territory personally in order to view matters on the spot. This document is the diary of a French officer, Lieutenant Ed. Dollfuss. On January 16, 1940 we find the entry: "Reconnoitered positions in Belgium." It is obvious that such reconnoitering carried out by French officers on Belgian territory could not have taken place without the consent of the Belgian Government.

Documents Nos. 7 and 8

These documents reveal that not only did individual French officers occasionally visit Belgian territory, but that entire French units had actually entered Belgium some time before May 10, that is to say, had been stationed there. From the numerous fresh proofs which we have of this, we here publish two depositions referring to observations made to this effect in the Belgian village of Bertrix, about 25 km distant from the French frontier. A subject of the State of Luxemburg living there, testified (Document No. 7) that he had noticed a French armored unit in Bertrix on May 3 or 4 and had recognized it with absolute certainty, also that it had come from the south, that is, from the French frontier and had proceeded in a northeasterly direction. This statement is supplemented by the information given by a soldier from a French tank detachment, captured a few kilometers northeast of Bertrix, in Recogne, during the German advance, who declared that his unit had been in Belgium since April 15 (Document No. 8).

Document No. 9

This is a memorandum by the General Staff of the 9th French Army respecting instructions for the planned Belgian move east of the Meuse. This secret "report," which was intended only for the General Staff of the 9th Army, includes a criticism of the Belgian plan of operation. This criticism shows that exact detailed directions had been given both regarding the foremost lines of the Belgian Army and the individual units that were to occupy these positions, and concerning the measures which were to be taken by the Belgians if the foremost line could not be held. It is obvious that such secret information could only be given directly by the Belgian High Command. All of this furnished incontestable proof of the close cooperation between the French and Belgian General Staffs.

Document No. 10

Document No. 10 is an order issued by the 2nd Belgian Grenadier Regiment on April 13, 1940. The order shows that the regiment had been ordered to improve an already existing fortified position between Ninove and Hal, in particular to construct wire entanglements, clear the field of fire, build up parapets, prepare camouflage, etc. It is especially significant that the very beginning of the order contains the heading "Particulars about friendly troops," and that the places mentioned in it which lie along the

French frontier, partly on French and partly on Belgian territory, show that these words can only refer to the French Army. This proves that military cooperation between the French and the Belgian Army was already so far advanced in April that the two were beginning to regard themselves as allies, and that even in orders intended for the lowest units the French troops were described as "friendly."

Document No. 11

This document is an order issued by the 2nd British Division and dated April 19, 1940. It shows clearly what preparations had been made for close cooperation with Belgian authorities, in particular with the police, for the impending advance into Belgium. It contains the information that representatives of the Belgian State Police would be attached to British Headquarters and to the individual corps, and directions are given for cooperation with the Belgian police. Attached to the order is a list of persons who were to be arrested in various places in Flanders immediately upon entry. These arrests were not to be carried out by British military but by the Belgian police.

Document No. 12

Document No. 12 is a rough map giving a clear impression of the French aims. The entries on this map, found on an officer of the 1st French Light Division, show that this division, stationed in the Valenciennes sector, was to cross the Belgian frontier on three separate routes obviously to advance without interruption as far as the Brussels-Charleroi Canal, between Tubize and Seneffe. The town of Soignies lying to the west of the Canal is detailed as the first Belgian Staff Headquarters of the division. The sector allocated to this division for its further advance toward the German frontier is marked on the map as far as St. Trond, a few kilometers south of the Albert Canal near Hasselt. Other markings on this map show that the territory north of this sector was reserved for the British Army. It is clear that such a plan of operation could only have been drawn up in agreement with the Belgian General Staff.

Document No. 13

In this document, the information which the rough map gives regarding the advance of the 1st Light Division is supplemented. It is an order of the same division, is dated December 18, 1939, and states what contacts

were provided for the advance. Side by side with British forces (2nd British Division or Hotblack Group) marching on the left flank of the division, would be the Belgian Army. Contacts were to be established not only with the Belgian field troops in this sector of the division but with the Belgian General Staff in Brussels. Contact with the General Staff was to be established from Soignies to Brussels by a motorized unit of French Cuirassiers.

Document No. 14

A map of roads for the British advance printed, as the imprint shows, in April, 1940, which proves that the British advance through Belgium had been settled in all its details as early as that time.

Document No. 15

This document also shows that on the advance through Belgium, contact was to be established with the British and Belgian troops. Mention is made here of the 3rd British Division which was to advance from its quarters near Lille via Audenarde and Louvain, and of a Belgian division which was stationed at Turnhout. Contact was also to be established with Belgian Headquarters, the exact position of which is stated in the order. Contact with the Dutch troops is similarly provided for. They were to be reached, in accordance with the marching orders given, in the Tilburg sector.

Document No. 16

The sixteenth document is an operation order issued by French Lt.-Col. Lestoquoi, commander of a special group commissioned with the task of advancing from their garrison near Dunkerque on a forced march through Belgium to occupy and safeguard the islands of Walcheren and Beverland. Paragraph XIII of this order expressly emphasizes cooperation with Belgian and Dutch troops during this operation.

Document No. 17

Document No. 17 is an operation order, dated November 15, 1939, and issued by French Lt.-Col. Astafort, in command of the Subsection west of the Lestoquoi group mentioned in Document No. 16. This French detachment was instructed to proceed as rapidly as possible from their headquarters in the neighborhood of Dunkerque to the Dutch village of Breskens

on the south bank of the Scheldt estuary and thence to cross by ferry to Flushing in order to safeguard the aerodrome situated there.

Document No. 18

An order, dated April 17, 1940, and issued by the leader of a French reconnaissance detachment, with reference to the advance through Belgium via Bruges and Antwerp to the Dutch town of Breda, this document, like the three preceding it, unmistakably reveals the full extent of the Franco-British intentions which aimed at occupying positions not only in Belgium but also in Holland, whence an attack could be launched against Germany. This document, moreover, shows especially clearly to what a large extent Franco-British plans of operations were based upon cooperation with the Belgian and Dutch armies and that they were preceded by a previous communication to the General Staffs concerned.

Document No. 19

This furnishes indisputable proof from another quarter that such General Staff conferences actually took place. It is a memorandum from Commander in Chief Winkelman of the Dutch forces, dated March 23, 1940, and was handed to the Belgian Government by the Dutch Minister in Brussels, and found in the Belgian Foreign Office during the advance of the German troops. This memorandum not only proves that military negotiations took place between Holland and Belgium, but it also shows clearly that these negotiations were based on the most detailed cooperation with the British and French General Staffs.

The memorandum states in detail how many divisions were expected from Britain and France and what measures were to be adopted in North Brabant in order to enable the Dutch to bring "into action a portion of their army side by side with the Belgian or the British and French forces in these provinces." In the course of the negotiations conducted to this end with the French and British Governments, General Winkelman—as the most important section of this memorandum states—emphatically pointed out that a withdrawal of the Dutch troops from the Grebbe Line to the Vesting Holland would be most regrettable from the Dutch as well as from the international point of view. For what reason? Because "a defense of the Grebbe Line leaves open the possibility of advancing from this line at any given moment in order to proceed to an attack." Although the memorandum—in keeping with the customary form of such documents—

refers chiefly to defensive measures, this sentence clearly shows that the negotiations were conducted solely with the intention of discovering how the Dutch position could best be incorporated in the far-reaching offensive plans of the Western Powers.

Our deductions may be summarized thus:

(1) Since the end of the Great War, General Staff talks have continued without interruption between Belgium and France. The same applies to cooperation between the Belgian and the British General Staffs. The German High Command possessed indisputable proof of all this. In the end, the Belgian Government no longer refrained from frank public references to this cooperation. Detailed military agreements were similarly concluded between the Dutch Government and Britain and France.

(2) Documents captured by German troops on their advance into Belgium—of which those published here are only a small first installment—irrefutably prove that the Franco-British advance on the Ruhr territory via Belgium and Holland was prepared in every particular by the General Staffs of the hostile powers as early as September, 1939, and that not only the General Staffs but the fighting forces of all the countries involved were informed of every detail of these orders.

In all probability, British and French authorities in their embarrassment will attempt to counter these incontrovertible proofs with the same excuse they made following the disclosures of *German White Book No. 4* in regard to British intentions to land in Norway, namely by stating that their plans only concerned a counterstroke. Although there is absolute proof that the British expedition to Norway was in progress as early as April 7, they asserted that the British plans were drawn up only when German ships were on the way to Narvik.

How unfounded the British excuses are was demonstrated by Joachim von Ribbentrop, German Minister for Foreign Affairs, in his statement to the Diplomatic Corps and representatives of the home and foreign press, regarding Britain's mine-laying in Norwegian territorial waters on April 8 in order to safeguard the landing of her expeditionary force in Stavanger, Bergen, Trondheim and Narvik. He further pointed out that orders to sail for the North had been issued to the German fleet only when information of the full details of this British plan had reached Germany. Germany's counterstroke, launched on April 9, only succeeded at the last minute in frustrating the British plan of landing in Norway. Further striking proof

of British intentions in Scandinavia is a document that fell into the hands of the German troops during their operations in Norway and provided truly sensational disclosures about the real aims of the British plans at that time. It concerned the plan of operation for the Avonforce detachment, originally ordered into action at Narvik, an order issued by the British War Office on April 6 (Document 20).

Document No. 20

In paragraph 2 of this order it is explicitly stated that the Swedish iron ore territory is to be the objective of this British enterprise. It says that at a moment to be fixed by the commander of the group an advance of British troops into Sweden to occupy the iron mines at Gallivare is to be launched.

Not a word is to be found in the order about the presence of German troops which, if credence is to be given to the statement of British ministers, were to be driven out of Norway. True, item 2 of the order reckons with possible enemy action, but in terms which show that it was expected at the beginning of May at the earliest, that is long after the intended British coup against Sweden.

This order clearly shows that the sole object the British Government had for its projected invasion of Norway was the occupation of the Swedish iron mines. The assertion that the British expedition to Scandinavia was merely a countermeasure is thus refuted once and for all. From the outset of the war declared by them, the Western Powers concentrated on counterbalancing the moral and military weakness of their position by endeavoring to enlist other, especially smaller, states to assist them in their aims. Scandinavia was to come first, then Holland, Belgium and Luxemburg. But the German sword put an end to their dastardly schemes.

THE GERMAN MEMORANDUM TO THE DUTCH AND BELGIAN GOVERNMENTS

May 10, 1940

The Reich Government for a long time has known of the main aim of British and French war policy. It consists of the expansion of war to other countries and the misuse of their peoples as auxiliary mercenary troops by England and France. The last attempt in this direction was a plan to occupy Scandinavia with the aid of Norway in order to establish a new front there against Germany.

This attempt was frustrated at the zero hour through Germany's interference. Germany gave the world public documentary proof of that.

Immediately after the failure of the British and French action in Scandinavia, England and France resumed their policies for the expansion in other directions.

Thus, during the flight-like retreat of the British troops from Norway the English Prime Minister announced that England, because of the changed situation, was now in a position to transfer the main force of her fleet to the Mediterranean and the English and French units were already on the way to Alexandria.

The Mediterranean now became the center of the Anglo-French war propaganda. Partly this was intended to conceal the defeat in Scandinavia and the great loss of prestige thereby suffered in the eyes of their own people and of the world, and partly to make it appear as if the Balkans now had been selected as the next theater of war against Germany.

Mediterranean Ruse

In reality, however, the ostensible shifting of Anglo-French war policy to the Mediterranean served an entirely different purpose: it was nothing more than a large-scale maneuver to divert attention in order to deceive Germany as to the actual scene of the next Anglo-French attack.

For some time it has been realized by the German Government that the true object of Britain and France is this: a carefully prepared and now imminent attack on Germany in the west with the view of advancing toward the Ruhr district across Belgian and Dutch territory.

Germany has recognized and respected the integrity of Belgium and Holland on the natural supposition that the two countries would preserve the strictest neutrality in the event of war between Germany on the one hand and Britain and France on the other.

Belgium and Holland have not complied with this condition.

It is true that so far they have tried to retain the outward appearance of neutrality, but the countries have favored Germany's enemies with complete partiality and have even supported them in their intentions.

Basing their views on documents in their possession and particularly on appended reports of the Reich Ministry of the Interior of March 29, 1940, and of the German High Command of May 4, 1940, the German Government desires to draw attention to the following facts:

First, since the outbreak of the war the Belgian and Dutch press have shown an anti-German attitude in excess even of that taken by British and French newspapers. In spite of continual protests on the part of the Reich they have not up to the present time changed their attitude.

In addition to this, leading personalities in public life in both countries have to an increasing extent in recent months expressed the view that the place of Belgium and Holland was at the side of Britain and France. Many other incidents in the political and business life of Belgium and Holland emphasize this tendency still more.

The Lowlands Join in the Allies' Plot

Second, Holland, in conjunction with certain Belgian circles, has lent herself to giving support to attempts of the British Secret Service to bring about a revolution in Germany, which amounts to a flagrant breach of her most elementary obligations as a neutral.

The organization built up by the secret service on Belgian and Dutch soil, which enjoyed the fullest support of the Belgian and Dutch authorities reaching as far as the highest circles of officials and of the General Staff, had no other object than the removal of the Fuehrer and of the German Government by all the means at their disposal and the setting up of a government in Germany which would be ready to work for the destruction of the unity of the Reich and would agree to the formation of a powerless federation of individual German states.

Dutch and Belgian Military Operations

Measures taken by the Belgian Government and the Dutch Government in the military sphere make the position even clearer. They provide incontrovertible proof of the true intentions of the policy pursued by Belgium and Holland.

They are in marked contrast to all declarations made by the Belgian Government and the Dutch Government to the effect that they would, with all their power and in every direction, oppose any attempt to make use of their sovereign territory for the passage of troops or as a base for operations on land, at sea or in the air.

Thus Belgium, to give an example, has fortified itself on its German border exclusively. Facing France no fortifications of any kind have been built. The repeated urgent representations of the German Government were, it is true, answered each time by the Belgian Government with assurances that care would be taken to put an end to this state of affairs, which operates against Germany only. In actual fact, however, nothing was ever done and all promises in this direction remained unfulfilled.

On the contrary, Belgium up to this very moment continued exclusively and unabatingly to perfect her fortifications against Germany. The Dutch coast represents an equally open and unguarded means of entry for the British Air Force. The German Government has furnished the Dutch Government, by a series of communications, with proof of the violation of Dutch neutrality by British aircraft.

Winking at Frequent Violations of Dutch Neutrality by British Planes

Since the outbreak of the war, British airmen have been appearing almost daily over German territory coming from Holland. There are 127 cases in which British military aircraft have crossed over Dutch territory. It has been indisputably proved in every detail, the Dutch Government being duly notified.

In reality, however, the number is far greater, being many times the number of cases noted. In all these additional cases there is likewise no doubt that the British planes were involved. The large number of cases in which Dutch territory has been flown over and the fact that the Dutch Government took no effective measures of any kind against this action prove without a shadow of doubt that the British Air Force has been using Dutch sovereign territory systematically as a base for operations against Germany with the knowledge and consent of the Dutch Government.

Concentration of Entire Armed Forces at German Border

Still more striking proof of the real attitude of Belgium and Holland is, however, the concentration of the entire mobilized Belgian and Dutch troops which is directed against Germany. While at the beginning of September, 1939, Belgium and Holland had their troops distributed fairly evenly along their frontiers, some time later and as collaboration between the Belgian and Dutch General Staffs and those of Britain and France intensified, the western frontiers of these countries were completely denuded of troops and the entire Belgian and Dutch forces concentrated against Germany on the eastern frontiers of these two countries.

This massing of Belgian and Dutch troops on the German frontier took place at a time when Germany had concentrated no troops on her Belgian-Dutch frontiers, but when Great Britain and France, on the contrary, had assembled strong mechanized attacking forces on the Franco-Belgian frontier.

In other words, at a time when the neutrality in the west appeared more and more menaced by the attitude of Great Britain and France, and by a massing of British and French troops, and when Belgium and Holland would consequently have had every reason to strengthen their protective measures here, they withdrew their own troops from the endangered western frontier to the east, where no German troops at all were stationed.

German Counter-measures Inevitable

It was not until that moment that Germany adopted her counter-measures and now also stationed her troops on the Belgian and Dutch frontiers. However, the Belgian and Dutch General Staffs by these sudden measures, entirely contrary to every rule of strategy, disclosed their true attitude.

Their action becomes understandable when it is realized that these measures were taken only because Belgian and Dutch troops have never considered themselves as anything but the vanguard of the Anglo-French Army.

Documents in possession of the German Government prove that preparations made by Britain and France on Belgian and Dutch territory for their attack on Germany have already reached an advanced stage.

Thus some considerable time ago all obstacles on the Franco-Belgian frontier which might have impeded the advance of the Anglo-French forces were secretly removed. Airdromes in Belgium and Holland were inspected

by British and French officers and improvements were duly carried out. Means of transport were stationed in readiness on the frontiers in Belgium and recently advanced staff and troop units of the British and French armies arrived in various places in Belgium and Holland.

These facts, as well as additional reports which have become more frequent in the last few days, are undeniable proof that an Anglo-French attack on Germany is imminent and that this envisaged attack on the Ruhr will take place through Belgium and Holland.

An impression of the Belgian and Dutch attitude as gained from these irrefutable facts is incontestible and clear. From the very outbreak of the war, contrary to the declaration ostensibly made by their Governments, both countries have secretly sided with Britain and France—that is to say, with the very powers who had determined to attack Germany and had actually declared war.

German Warning Disregarded

Although the attention of the Belgian Foreign Minister has on more than one occasion been earnestly directed by Germany toward this attitude, no change whatsoever has ensued.

On the contrary, the Belgian Minister for Defense recently made a statement in Belgium tantamount to admission that the General Staffs of Belgium, France and Britain had come to an agreement on all measures necessary for concerted action against Germany. If, in spite of this, Belgium and Holland still persist in making a pretext of a policy of independence and neutrality, this cannot explain away these indubitable facts, and the attitudes of the two governments cannot be regarded as anything but an attempt at deception as to the real intentions of Belgian and Dutch policy.

In view of this state of affairs, the German Government can no longer doubt that Belgium and Holland are determined not only to tolerate the impending Anglo-French attack, but support it in every direction, and that agreements reached between the General Staffs of the two countries and those of Britain and France can serve only this purpose. The objection advanced by Belgium and Holland that this development does not conform with their intentions, and that their helplessness in the face of Britain and France simply compelled them to adopt this attitude, we cannot accept as valid.

In any case, as far as Germany is concerned, it has no bearing on the situation.

A Life and Death Struggle for Germany

The struggle for life and death was thrust on the German people by Britain and France. The German Government does not intend to await an attack by Britain and France, nor to allow the war to be carried through Belgium and France to German soil.

They have, therefore, issued orders for their troops to safeguard the neutrality of the countries with all the military means at the disposal of the Reich.

The German Government desires to make the following supplementary announcement: German soldiers are not entering Holland and Belgium as enemies, for the German Government neither desired nor brought about this development. The responsibility rests with Britain and France and with the Belgian and Dutch Governments, who tolerated and favored them.

The German Government further declares that Germany does not intend by these measures to attack the integrity of the Kingdom of Belgium and the Kingdom of Holland or their possessions or property in Europe or in their colonies, either now or in the future.

It is still in the power of the Belgian and Dutch Governments today to safeguard the welfare of all their people at the last moment by insuring that no resistance to the German troops is offered. The German Government herewith requests the two governments to issue the necessary orders without delay. Should the German troops encounter opposition in Belgium or Holland, it will be crushed with every means. The Belgian and Dutch Governments alone would bear the responsibility for the consequences and for the bloodshed, which would then become unavoidable.

STATEMENT OF THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF

May 4, 1940

FIRST, *contrary to the statement made by the Belgian King to the effect that Belgium would pursue a policy independent from the grouping of the great powers, Belgian defenses on land were solely directed against Germany. Liège was turned into the mightiest fortress in Western Europe, while Namur was fortified only against the east. The frontier with France remained unfortified.*

These facts were established beyond a doubt by German reconnaissance planes flying along the Belgian border.

The Belgian-Polish Agreement of 1937

SECOND, *documents found in Warsaw prove the cooperation of Polish and Belgian military authorities, especially as far as the exchange of information, material and news concerning Germany goes.*

On May 1, 1937, the following agreement was made between the Belgian General Staff and the Polish Military Attaché in Paris:

“The Belgian General Staff with the consent of the Belgian War Office agrees to cooperation with the Second Division of the Polish General Staff concerning the exchange of information concerning the German Army.

“The Polish Military Attaché at Brussels will be entrusted with the task of acting as the liaison officer.

“The Polish Military Attaché reported to the Polish Government that to the best of his knowledge the Belgian Foreign Ministry had been informed of this cooperation.”

The Belgian General Staff offered to Poland, Belgian information concerning the German Army, Navy and Air Force.

The Poles promised corresponding material to the Belgians for the middle of June, 1937.

Belgian Troop Concentration on German Border

THIRD, *the distribution of Belgian military forces and the deployment of Belgian troops was exclusively directed against Germany.*

Since the end of October of 1939, of a total of twenty-one mobilized Belgian divisions fourteen were stationed along the German border while three divisions were kept in reserve near Brussels. Only four reserve divisions were drawn up along the coast and the French border.

On the occasion of military leaves suspended in Belgium on Nov. 11, 1939, further strong Belgian forces were sent to the German border, while the coast and French border were left almost entirely unprotected. This one-sided deployment of Belgian troops was not changed, even when strong Anglo-French motorized units were placed along the Belgian-French frontier up to the coast.

This distribution of Belgian forces was followed up on Jan. 14, 1940, by an order to Belgian troops at Belgium's southwestern border and in the Ardennes forbidding them explicitly to fire on French troops.

FOURTH, *other technical measures taken by Belgium fully correspond with the attitude directed against Germany.*

While since the beginning of the war military obstacles on roads leading into Belgium from Germany were intensified and multiplied, since January, 1940, all military precautionary measures taken by Belgians along the French border were canceled. Moreover, evacuation orders for important military establishments were given only in the vicinity of the German border.

The same holds good as far as evacuation of the population is concerned. Significantly enough, Belgian evacuees were sent to districts near the French border.

Belgian Military Arrangements

FIFTH, *since October, 1939, indications were growing that Belgium had made military arrangements with England and France.*

A decree issued by the Belgian Defense Minister as early as 1937 contains detailed instructions of the distribution of various main roads in the event of an Anglo-French march into Belgium.

Belgian police along the French border received orders on Nov. 11, 1939, to clear the ways for French marching into Belgium and to remove all civilian vehicles from the roads.

To facilitate the transport of Anglo-French troops through Belgium, rail-

way material, especially engines and empty trains, were kept in readiness near the French border.

For the same purpose motor cars and lorries were concentrated near the French frontier.

A telegram to the chief office of the Belgian railways dated the night of the 13th to the 14th of January underlined the importance of these measures. The telegram reads:

"No more objections need be raised to use of Belgian railway material by Franco-British troops."

On Dec. 12, 1939, Mayors in the Ardennes district received orders to make necessary preparations for the accommodation of French troops.

Belgian Cooperation with Allied General Staff

During November and December of 1939 a special French detachment appeared near Liège and in the Ardennes district making, without the knowledge of the Belgian authorities, preparations for the marching of French troops into Belgium.

Since December, 1939, at various places in Belgium, French military engineers supervised the construction of fortifications and British engineers constructed concrete platforms for heavy artillery.

On April 20, the British steamer *City of Simla* arrived in Antwerp with arms, ammunition and tanks for British troops. War material was unloaded in Antwerp.

These facts show beyond doubt that twice in the middle of October, 1939, Belgium openly prepared assistance to be given Allied forces.

The task allotted to the Belgian Army was to intercept the German counter-attack against British and French troops pushing forward in the direction of the Ruhr district and to hold Germans back until Anglo-French troops had found time to close up with the Belgians.

SIXTH, *all reports on hand about the Anglo-French lining up of troops as well as the results of aerial reconnaissance show unmistakably that the left wing has been set aside for attack through Belgian territory.*

Practically all motorized infantry divisions as well as tank and cavalry divisions lined up on the Belgian frontier. They include a large number of North African divisions which are regarded as explicit shock-troop divisions.

Despite this, complete opening of the Belgian southwest frontier and the one-sided lining up of Belgians against Germany was not recalled.

Cooperating with the Allied Air Force

SEVENTH, *in the field of air force, military cooperation between Belgium and the Western powers against Germany has been proved.* It extends to the supply of material, active support in the manufacture of airplanes and the establishment of airports and air bases for Britain.

Violations of neutrality of Belgian territory by airplanes of Western powers without sufficient defensive measures on the part of Belgium are further proof of this unilateral attitude.

EIGHTH, *Belgium supports the Western powers in the field of naval warfare by not carrying out the Belgian decree that ships entering the port of Antwerp must unload explosives of more than 300 kilograms.* However, for the benefit of the armed merchantmen of the Western powers this decree was not enforced of late.

NINTH, *especially grave are recent reports not only that Britain has been long prepared for marching into Belgium but that British advance commanders were already stationed in Belgian official quarters and have already occupied important airdromes.*

These reports prove that the marching in of British and French troops into Belgium was imminent.

Dutch Violations of Neutrality

The change of deployment of Dutch troops since the beginning of 1939 absolutely contradicts frequent Dutch assurances that Holland would defend her neutrality against whoever was likely to threaten it.

While in September, 1939, five Dutch divisions were stationed in Western Holland, which fronts against England, only two divisions were drawn up along the Grebbe Line and the Dutch eastern border. Deployment was entirely the reverse early in 1940.

Almost eight divisions were lined up along the Grebbe Line and south thereof, while in the Maastricht corner, only one regiment was stationed and a new division was formed in Peel Heath.

Later another two newly-formed divisions were sent to the Grebbe Line facing east, while in the interiors of Holland only parts of two divisions remained, and Holland's defense against the west was safeguarded solely by a regiment of marines, regiments of second and third line and a battalion of recruits.

Since then no material change occurred in this deployment of Dutch troops directed against Germany.

Simultaneously Dutch interior fortifications were built along the German border, while no such measures were taken in Western Holland or along the Dutch coast. *Jan. 12, 1940, discussions took place in Breda between Dutch, Belgian, French and British staff officers.*

One-Sided Defenses

In October, 1936, the King of the Belgians declared that Belgium would in the future avoid leaning on any great power and would pursue a policy independent of groups of powers.

As a consequence of this independence policy it could be expected that from now on military preparations would be taken for the defense of her independence not only against Germany but also against France and England.

It must be stated, however, that Belgian fortifications were directed one-sidedly against Germany since the World War; that Liège was made the most powerful fortified base of Western Europe and that the strengthening of fortifications at Namur was carried out only on the Eastern Front.

On the frontiers of Germany, Luxemburg and the Netherlands a deep and dense net of strong frontier fortifications came into existence. On the other hand the frontier toward France remained completely unfortified.

That this fortification system was incompatible with the newly initiated independence policy was admitted in the Summer of 1937 by the Chief of the Belgian General Staff, General von den Bergen, when he declared that at the moment—as was quite natural—the entire fortification system of Belgium still faced the east.

He added that before long, however, Germany would have the occasion to observe that the new political situation being taken into account by Belgium would mean security measures against all on all sides.

These Belgian declarations were not carried into effect in the ensuing two and one-half years.

On March 2, 1938, the Belgian Minister of Defense, Lieut. Gen. Henri Denis, declared in the Chamber that "Belgium retained a free hand regarding the execution of plans to fortify the country with the reservation, however, that she could follow foreign counsel or pay attention to eventual necessity of cooperating with other States."

According to the situation existing at that time this intimation referred to the cooperation of Belgium with France and England.

The budget for 1939 contained an item of 1,000,000 francs for the fortification of the southern frontier.

The sum of 270,000,000 francs was to be expended for the perfection of fortifications on the eastern frontier, which was already heavily fortified. Thus the disproportion existing between the two frontiers was further increased.

French Frontier Left Unfortified

German air reconnaissance over the French fortifications at the Belgian frontier ascertained beyond doubt that the Belgian frontier against France was still completely unfortified.

Through other reliable reports it is known that only a small number of light field fortifications were constructed south of Brussels on the line of Ninove-Hal-Waterloo.

This weak line, however, cannot be valued as a fortification along the frontier against France. It represents rather an extension of the "reduit national" that is, the area of retreat for the Belgian Army in case of war against Germany.

The southern portion of the country on both banks of the rivers Sambre and Maas are still open to the French advance toward the German-Belgian frontier.

On Feb. 8, 1940, this fact led to a sharp dispute in the Belgian Chamber between the Belgian Minister of Defense and a Belgian Deputy.

In view of the lack of activity at the French frontier, it is all the more significant that not only at the end of the Summer of 1937, but even at the present time, fortifications directed against an allegedly projected German attack were being rushed to completion.

Visits of High French Officials

The French General Dosse, then the inspector of French training of reserve officers, inspected in January, 1939, an army school for the further education of French reserve officers living in Belgium at Brussels.

It is not known to what extent Belgian officers participated in this affair—but Belgian generals, including the Minister of Defense as the official representative of the Belgian Army, participated in the dinner following the inspection. Official speeches were exchanged.

Such French activity on Belgian territory with the consent and participation of Belgian officials did not conform with the policy of independence announced by the Belgian King.

Belgium did nothing to prepare the ground for a really neutral attitude of the population, particularly against the German Army.

While the closest contact was being maintained between the Belgian and French and English Armies, while, even as late as 1939, crack French companies visited Belgian troops units and public fraternization scenes occurred, agitation against the German Army was tolerated and may even have been promoted.

It is still further significant that in 1937 notorious atrocity pictures were hung in the Citadel of Namur, a building owned by the army, and that they were used for systematic agitation against Germany.

Documents Seized in Warsaw Corroborate German Charge

Documents of the Polish General Staff seized in Warsaw gave irreproachable proof for the Belgian-Polish cooperation in the exchange of information concerning Germany.

The following can be ascertained from a letter of the Polish Military Attaché in Paris, a colonel of the General Staff, Colonel Fyda, to the chief of the secretary of the department of the Polish General Staff dated May 7, 1937:

“On May 1, 1937, following the agreement concluded between the chief of the Belgian General Staff and Colonel Fyda:

“The Belgian General Staff consents with the approval of the War Ministry to cooperate with the Polish General Staff regarding the exchange of information on the German armed forces.

“Information will be exchanged through the Polish Military Attaché at Brussels.

“Colonel Fyda reports that it could be assumed that the Belgian Foreign Ministry was informed regarding the cooperation.

“The Chief of the Belgian General Staff ordered the immediate exchange of Belgian elaborations of March, 1937, regarding the disposition of the German Army, Air Force and Navy.

“Colonel Fyda rejects this under pretext and requests a decision by telegram of the Chief of the Second Department in Warsaw.

“A telegram from the Chief of the Second Department in Warsaw was dispatched to Colonel Fyda: ‘Agreed.—Polish material will be sent in the middle of June.’”

This proved beyond doubt that Polish-Belgian cooperation existed until the beginning of the German-Polish war.

Distribution of forces and deployment of the Belgian Army were directed against Germany.

In peacetime the Belgian frontier in the East was occupied by troops to a considerably stronger degree than along the southwestern frontier.

Basic Change in Belgian Army Formation

To this must be added that at the German frontier troops for an emergency were stationed but not at the French frontier.

At the outbreak of the war the Belgian Army was still concentrating a majority of its divisions along the southwestern frontier.

At the end of September, nine infantry divisions and two cavalry divisions were stationed at the fronts to the southwest and west. However, on the eastern front there were only three divisions, and one division in reserve and two divisions in the vicinity of the training ground at Beverloo.

However, after October 2, 1939, a basic change in the formation of the Belgian Army took place and the largest part of the Belgian Army units was shifted to the northeastern frontier.

Since the latter part of October out of twenty-one mobilized divisions of the field army about fourteen divisions were placed in position at the northern and eastern frontiers between Antwerp and south of Liège; three divisions stood as reserve units in the Brussels area and about four divisions stood at the southwest frontier and along the coastal area.

All night-leaves of November 7 and 8 were canceled for the entire Belgian Army, and numerous omnibuses and trucks were called in for army duty.

It is confirmed that on November 8 a transportation movement started. Thereby strong forces were shifted from the area around Brussels, from the coastal area and from the southwest frontier. This shift led to an almost complete military evacuation of the coast and the French frontiers.

Over two-thirds of the Belgian Army troops are stationed at the eastern frontier and behind the Albert Canal. The remainder is stationed around Brussels as reserve and in the coastal area.

Only the weak protective units without artillery remained at the French frontier and in the coastal area.

On April 10, 1940, about forty small troop detachments were shipped from the Albert Canal to the interior of the country. This, however, did not imply a strengthening of the forces at the Belgian southern frontier or at the coast against the Western powers, but simply meant the intention to keep certain reserves behind the front lines.

During the next few days part of these forces was shifted again to the northeastern frontier.

Resistance was not supposed to be made, since irrefutable proof exists that on the morning of Jan. 14 all Belgian troops stationed on the southwest border and in the Ardennes area were forbidden to shoot at advancing English and French troops.

Technical preparations for safeguarding the frontier were one-sidedly directed against Germany.

At the outbreak of the war a dense net of prepared and guarded obstacles existed at the German frontier, while at the French frontier there were only a few light obstacles.

Obstacles at the French frontier, as far as could be ascertained, were removed in October, 1939, and in January, 1940. Blasting charges were removed also from overhead structures.

Evacuation of military establishments and manufacturing centers important for war production and evacuation of the population was prepared only in areas along the German frontier.

It is significant that the destinations for the evacuated are the towns along the French frontier.

Since October, 1939, evidence has accumulated that Belgium not only favored England and France by a one-sided military and political attitude but also concluded military conventions with both powers.

Belgium reserved, by a declaration of the foreign affairs committee of the Senate on June 22, 1939, the right for her General Staff to hold consultations with the General Staffs of other countries.

In a debate in the Chamber on March 7, 1940, the Belgian Minister of Defense stated with regard to the military guarantees of certain powers that the guarantee "in order to be effective" must operate immediately.

"In regard to this necessity I can give assurance that no factor has been neglected that will enable those powers guaranteeing our independence to fulfill obligations voluntarily assumed by them."

Use of Roads Provided

This statement clearly shows that consultations had taken place between the Belgian General Staff and the General Staffs of Western powers, for no such consultation had taken place with the German General Staff.

It must be observed that consultations of this sort that formed the basis for the immediate putting into effect of the guarantee obligations assured by France and England must have been carried on with the approval of the highest quarters.

Regulations issued by the Belgian Ministry of Defense in 1937 contained precise details regarding the use of roads in the event of a Franco-British advance.

The following observations prove also that measures had been taken by Belgium in view of the entry of Franco-British troops and that consultations between the General Staffs of Belgium, France and England had taken place that were directed unilaterally against Germany.

On November 11, 1939, gendarmes on the French frontier received instructions to make the roads clear in the event of the entry of French troops and to bar all civilian vehicles from those roads.

However, in the neighborhood of the German frontier all road signs were removed. In the vicinity of the French frontier they either remained or were replaced.

Similar observations were made on Jan. 13 and 14, 1940.

Railways Kept Ready for Allies

In order to facilitate the transport of French and British troops, railway material, including numerous locomotives, were kept in readiness at the French frontier.

Similar facts were observed on Jan. 23 and Jan. 24, 1940, and at the beginning of April on the Franco-Belgian frontier stretching from Mons to Maubeuge and from Roubaix to Charleroi.

For the same purpose French automobile columns were assembled on the French frontier.

During the night from Oct. 13-14, 1939, the administration of Belgian railways in Brussels sent out a telegram ordering that Belgian trains must be kept empty and at the disposal of the French and British troops.

The telegram read as follows:

"No objection to utilization of Belgian railway material by French and British troops."

According to a report, a French motorized column on Jan. 15 stood ready with full equipment to march on the French sector of the road from Steenvoorde to Poperinghe at the spot where the road in question marks the border line between France and Belgium.

The French commanding officer proceeded to a distance of about 200 meters within Belgian territory with the object of ascertaining whether advance into Belgium had been ordered, and had conversation on the subject with the Belgian officer. Since no such orders had been given, the French officer withdrew to his detachment.

No attempt was made to intern the French officer.

On Jan. 15, 1940, a French motorized column crossed the Belgian frontier and marched some kilometers into the country in the direction of Poperinghe. The local Belgian commander authorized the French column to return without further ado.

French Officers at Liège

The Burgomasters (Mayors) in the Ardennes region received instruction on Dec. 10, 1939, to provide for the accommodation of French troops.

In connection with the reports received from France it has been ascertained that in December, 1939, Belgian intelligence troops were attempting to establish information quarters for the French High Command.

In November and December, 1939, French officers charged with the duty of preparing the French advance were staying in the environs of Liège and in the Ardennes region with cognizance of Belgian officers.

The French officers in question were camouflaged as soldiers on leave and had their uniforms with them in their trunks.

The fortified positions near Liège and on the Albert Canal, construction on which required the service of a great number of men and engineers, were clearly destined from the very beginning for utilization by the British and French forces since the extensive nature of those positions was not adapted to the means at the disposal of the Belgian Army.

In December, 1939, it was observed that the work of fortifying the district of Dinant as well as the region northwest of Mons was being supervised by French engineers.

For this purpose French engineers daily crossed the frontier in French motor cars and drove to Dinant whence they were brought to their respective stations in Belgian military cars.

Work carried out in the district of Ervelde in Flanders for digging the auxiliary canal and for the construction of positions for anti-aircraft batteries, artillery and wide-range guns was directed by British engineers.

On April 4, 1940, a report from Antwerp said that the steamer *City of Simla*, 11,000 tons, had arrived from London with a cargo of arms, munitions and tanks for British troops and that the cargo in question had been discharged.

DOCUMENTS

DOCUMENT NO. 1

ORDERS ISSUED BY THE COMMANDER OF THE FRENCH DETACHMENT OPERATING IN LUXEMBURG, MAY 2, 1940

[Translation]
Secret

**204th Inf. Rgt.
The Commander of the
Detachment Operating in
Luxemburg.
No. 3264/C**

SERVICE INSTRUCTIONS

CHANGE IN THE ORDER FOR WITHDRAWAL

The 2nd Battalion of the 204th Inf. Rgt. will occupy the farm of AIRSAIN on receipt of the order:

“Enter Luxemburg, move immediately.”

The motorcycle scout section of the 334th Inf. Rgt., which was to have occupied this farm, will not do so.

A motorcyclist will be sent by the battalion commander in charge of the detachment to convey the withdrawal order to the Lieutenant commanding The Motorcycle Scout Section of the 334th Inf. Rgt., who will take the RODANGE LONGLAVILLE route and place himself at the disposal of his corps commander.

H.Q. May 2, 1940.

FEUILLATRE, Battalion Commander in
charge of the Detachment operating in
Luxemburg.

Distribution:

Motorcycle Scout Section of the 204th Inf.Rgt.

Motorcycle Scout Section of the 334th Inf.Rgt. c/o Commander.

4 ALLIED INTRIGUE IN THE LOW COUNTRIES

The Colonel in command of the 334th Inf.Rgt.

Shock troop detachment of the 204th Inf.Rgt. c/o Commander of II/204.

Shock troop detachment of the 227th Inf.Rgt. c/o Regimental Commander.

Shock troop detachment of the 334th Inf.Rgt. c/o Regimental Commander.

Commander of the 7th Comp. c/o Commander II/204 Inf.Rgt.

Commander of the 9th Comp. c/o Commander III/204 Inf. Rgt.

Leader of the two motorized sections of C.A.3, c/o Commander III/204 Inf. Rgt. (2 copies).

File (2 copies).

DOCUMENT NO. 2

**REGIMENTAL ORDERS REGARDING OBJECTIVES IN BELGIUM
ISSUED BY THE 4TH FRENCH CAVALRY RECONNAISSANCE
CAR REGIMENT, APRIL 2, 1940**

[Translation]

H. Q. April 2, 1940.

**4th Light Division
14th Light Brigade
4th Cavalry Reconnaissance Car Regiment**

OPERATION INSTRUCTION NO. 1

Maps used: scale 1/50,000,^o "Michelin"

- A. Task Assigned to the 4th Cavalry Reconnaissance Car Rgt. The 4th Light Division Covers the 2nd Army Corps (Left Wing of the 9th Army).

The 4th C.R.C.Rgt. (less the 3rd Tank Squadron) reinforced by a section of 25 mm anti-tank guns, one M.G. section of the 14th Motorized Rifle Rgt. and a motorcycle pioneer section under the command of the Lt. Col. commanding the 4th C.R.C.Rgt., cooperating toward the south with the scout detachments and the advanced protective detachment of the 1st Cavalry Division, and to the north with the same units

of the reconnaissance group of the 2nd Army, as well as with the Cavalry Corps, is ordered:

1. To take possession of the crossings over the Meuse, between DAVE and ANHEE inclusive, to occupy protective positions on the SART—BERNARD—MAILLEN—CRUPET—DORINNE line, and to send out scouts in the direction of DURBUY and MARCHE.
2. To thrust advanced protective detachments beyond the line mentioned, as soon as the advance guards of the 14th Motorized Rifle Rgt. have arrived, and after completing reconnoitering from MARCHE toward STRAVELOT.

B. Intentions of the Lt.-Col. Commanding the 4th Cavalry Reconnaissance Car Rgt.

1. To proceed as rapidly as possible to the Meuse, to occupy and hold its crossings and to take special defensive measures on the BIOUL—GODINNE—YVOIR line.
2. To reconnoiter as quickly as possible beyond the above-mentioned line, with principal points of attack in the southern part.
3. To establish advanced protection along the line decided upon, such protection first of all offering resistance in the southern part of the section (CRUPET—DORINNE).
4. To repulse small enemy detachments which might have crossed the Meuse, and in any case to assure possession of the LESVES—BIOUL line of observation posts, to keep possession of the fringe of the woods to the west of the river.

C. Operation Area of the 4th Cavalry Reconnaissance Car Division and Roads of Advance I¹ and I², See Maps. Movement Toward the Meuse.

A) The regiment will proceed in two columns using the routes I¹ and I², each column in three sections: reconnaissance, protection, first-line transport 1.

1. Northern Group. Commander: the Commander of the second group of squadrons. Route I².

Reconnaissance Unit 2 (one section of armored reconnaissance cars, one section of motorcycle riflemen), two sections of the 4th Squadron of motorcycle riflemen, one 25 mm anti-tank gun.

First-line transport 1 of this group.

ALLIED INTRIGUE IN THE LOW COUNTRIES

2. Southern Group. Commander: the Lt.-Col. and Regimental Commander. Route I¹.

Reconnaissance Unit 1 under the command of the Squadron Leader commanding the first group of squadrons (two motorcycle sections of the 2nd Squadron—two sections of armored reconnaissance cars). Regimental staff: one motorized section of engineers, one section of armored reconnaissance cars, and one section of motorcycle riflemen (protective reserve under the command of an officer to be detailed by the Squadron Leader commanding the first group of squadrons).

2 sections of motorcycle riflemen of the 4th Squadron, 3 25 mm anti-tank guns, 1 M.G. section of the 14th Rifle Rgt. (motorized) under the command of the Captain commanding the 4th Motorcycle Squadron.

First-line transport 1 of the group in command of the officer in charge of execution of service details.

The anti-tank gun section, the M.G. section and the motorized section of engineers are to reach EPPE—SAUVAGE, as soon as alarm has been given.

- B) Section Limits: cross-roads south of EPPE—SAUVAGE—FOUR-BECHIES—DAUSSOIS—GOMEZEE—BOIS DU PRINCE GRAUX—BOIS DE NEFFE—BOIS MARLY-RIVIERE, all these points to the Southern Group.
- C) Protection: advance guard columns will be protected by one section of armored reconnaissance cars and one section of motorcycle riflemen each.
- D) Objective No. 1: line GERPINNES—MORIALME—FLOR-ENNES. Contact to be established by advance guards on the line MORIALME—FLORENNES.
Objective No. 2: advance guards reach heights or cross-roads to the east of the Meuse. Main body: the Meuse.
- E) Immediately on arriving at the Meuse, the advance guards must immediately establish contact in a northerly direction with the reconnaissance group of the 2nd Army and with the fortified region of NAMUR; in a southerly direction with the 1st Light Cavalry Division near DINANT.

- F) Demarcation of Sectors: to be carried out by the group commanders by means of motorcyclists.
- G) Starting Points: the Belgian frontier for both groups. Starting times will be stipulated in accordance with alarm orders.
- H) Destinations for Northern Group, to be ordered by the Squadron Leader commanding the respective group. For Southern Group, to be ordered by an officer to be detailed by the Captain commanding the 4th Motorcycle Rifle Squadron.
- I) Workshop Train: at end of first-line transport 1.¹
- K) Anti-Aircraft Defense: by means of automatic arms, each group provides anti-aircraft defense at the intervals between the marching columns, and at the end of the groups by a motorcycle rifle group of the 4th Squadron.
- L) Anti-Tank Defense: by means of armored reconnaissance cars and anti-tank guns; for the Southern Group by means of a 25 mm anti-tank gun at the head of first-line transport 1.
- M) Lighting: when marching off at night: one vehicle with dimmed lights at the head of each section or corresponding unit, all other vehicles show parking light.
- N) Distance between units on the march: 50 meters between vehicles, 100 meters between sections or corresponding units, 400 meters between groups of two sections or corresponding units.
- P) Composition and Movement of Groups and Baggage: see Appendix.
- Q) Squadron Commanders will give all detail orders necessary for the composition of the groups (first echelons of supply and first-line transport 1) in their quarters, further for the movement of these units in the region of EPPE—SAUVAGE, as well as for the alignment of the columns on the respective lines of march, in the direction of the starting points. The staff commander must determine rallying points for first-line transport and for the regimental transport. In any event the road from MOUSTIER—EPPE to SAUTIN or RANCE must be cleared of vehicles immediately after the alarm is given.

¹ J) is omitted in the original document.

DOCUMENT NO. 3**MAINTENANCE INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING FUEL SUPPLIES
IN BELGIUM FOR THE 4TH FRENCH LIGHT DIVISION**

[Translation]

4th Light Division
14th Light Brigade, Motorized
4th Cavalry Reconnaissance Car Regt.

2nd Squadron**EXTRACT FROM INSTRUCTION NO. 202 S/4 OF THE 4TH
LIGHT CAVALRY DIVISION.**

- I. Initial allotment of transport means, and preparations for the start:
- a) At the disposition of the Corps within the tactical groups:
 - First-line transport 1: ration lorries
 - field kitchens
 - fuel tank wagons
 - munition lorries to move with the Corps.
 - b) With the Division:
 - First-line transport 2 (remainder). Regimental transport collected separately for the different corps. Movement to be decided by the Division.
 - c) Sent forward to the repair bases:
 - Workshops for the motorized units (except Maintenance). Movement to be decided by the Division.
- II. Supplies for the troops:
- On J1 and J2 (time), in the morning:
- Rations, replenishment of fuel and ammunition to be provided by the groups according to orders issued by the groups, and from the supply of first-line transport 1 on the march with the groups.
- Commencing on J2, in the morning:
- Remainder of first-line transport 2, distribution commands of first-

line transports of groups, and, if required, ammunition must, as a matter of principle, be advanced to the following first points of destination: 4th Cavalry Reconnaissance Car Rgt. up to cross-roads 1 km east of ARBRE.

III. Allotment of maintenance commencing at J2, in the evening:

During J2, the distribution sections return to the base empty, together with the Corps vehicles. They will be included in the supply columns.

First-line transport 2 will be regrouped and remains at the disposal of the group leaders.

IV. Deployment behind the Meuse:

Base: Regimental transport: CHATELET

Fuel: CHATELET

Ammunition: PESCHE

Corps Workshops:

4th Cavalry Reconnaissance Car Regt: FALISOLLE

First-line transport 2:

4th Cavalry Reconnaissance Car Rgt.: region east of ARBRE.

V. Traffic Regulation:

a) Control:

Up to the road connecting CHARLEROI and PHILIPPEVILLE (R. 19) control by the Army.

Between connecting road R. 15 and the Meuse, by the Division.

After the arrival of the advance guard of the 5th Inf. Div. (motorized) on the Meuse, by the 2nd Army Corps.

b) Traffic Regulation:

Traffic may proceed day and night until further orders in all the divisional zones, except the following restrictions: it is prohibited during the nights of J1, J2, J3, J4; from 8.00 P.M. to 6.00 A.M. on the days when the motorized units are unloaded; and for columns of more than ten vehicles unless specific permission is given by Division H.Q.

All columns must maintain a minimum distance of 100 meters between vehicles both moving and stationary.

VI. Fuel:

Organization of fuel supply:

During the day of J1: supply from civilian Belgian filling stations against special vouchers is regulated by the group leaders and by the independent detachment commanders.

Vouchers 112, stamped "ARMEE FRANCAISE" will be forwarded to the Corps before moving; they are valid for both the private Belgian filling stations and the Army filling stations.¹

DOCUMENT NO. 4

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE TRANSPORTATION OF FRENCH
TROOPS TO BELGIUM BY RAIL

[Translation]

General H.Q., April 16, 1940.

High Command of the Army.
General Headquarters.
General Staff.
4th Bureau.
2nd Division.
No. 7.813—4/F.T.

Instructions
 for transportation by rail
 according to Plan "Y"

A railway transport plan, in the event of operations on Belgian territory, has been set up at the request of the armies, for the units allotted to them which will move automatically according to the events of day J1.

This plan has been worked out on the understanding that the day J1 will be fixed by an order given the previous day before midnight, whereupon the first departures can be made as from 18.00 o'clock on day J1.

It appears that the system of entrainment prepared on the basis of the events of a certain day is too rigid. If the decision were taken during the

¹ Here follows a list of Belgian civilian filling stations.

morning of a given day, the rail transports would not start until the following day from 18.00 o'clock on, which in this case would mean a considerable delay in the rail transports.

It has, therefore, been decided that the entrainment plan shall remain unchanged, provided decision is made between 18 and 24 o'clock the day previous to day J1; that, however, if the decision is given before 18.00 o'clock, the whole plan of automatic transport shall be advanced by six hours, twelve hours or eighteen hours, as the case may be, it being understood that the minimum notice at present provided for the notification of the troops shall remain unchanged.

The commanders of the units whose transportation by rail is effected automatically in the event of operations in BELGIUM are, therefore, requested to maintain close contact with the offices of the Rail Transport Officer which have arranged for their transportation.¹

These authorities will specifically advise each unit at the proper time whether the original plan is to be advanced and by how many hours, or whether it shall operate as provided for.

For the General in Supreme Command of the Army.

For the Major-General:
(signed) HANOTEAU,
Major-General, attached.

Distribution:

.....
7th Army
.....

Secret

Staff Headquarters, April 18, 1940.

7th Army
General Staff.
4th Bureau.
No. 9280—S1/4.

COPY TRANSMITTED

- 1. To 21st Inf.-Div.
for execution as far as contacting the Field Railway Office is concerned which has made preparations for transportation from there.

¹ See facsimile, p. A8, for footnote.

2. For information to:

.....

The instructions for putting into effect the plan contained in Table V of instruction No. 7.996 S1/4 of April 7, 1940, will be communicated to the large units, to the commands, as well as to the authorities mentioned under 2. by the Army Commander (General Staff, 4th Bureau).

The General in Command of the 7th Army.

By Order

(signed).....

Colonel and Chief of General Staff.

R. Z. Hazebrouck. A¹

April 13, 1940.

DOCUMENT NO. 5

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE STUDY OF MARCH ROUTES INTO BELGIUM

[Translation]

INSTRUCTION NO. IV

ROUTES

I. MARCH ROUTES (2 sketches attached)

Should the Light Motorized Division halt on the CHARLEROI Canal or on the contrary proceed without break to the transverse line WAVRE—GEMBLOUX, the routes allotted to the various groups on the move remain the same as far as the Belgian frontier.

Across the Belgian frontier the plan of march will change according to the situation offered.

II. STARTING POINT AND TIME OF CROSSING THE FRONTIER

The units forming part of the various groups will commence their march from the starting point at the time stated below.²

¹ Charts follow. See facsimiles, pp. A9 and A10.

² Here follows a table. See facsimile, p. A11.

III. RECONNAISSANCE AND STUDY OF ROUTES

The reconnaissance of routes I₁—I₂—I₃ as far as the frontier, must have been previously carried out by all Captains and Section Leaders. N.C.O.s for direction finding, workshop staff, baggage-train group leaders, etc., in short, all the officers responsible for the direction of the smallest formations or by N.C.O.s who have to proceed alone (workshop, staff, direction-finders, detail).

The study of march routes beyond the frontier will have to be made by map. The sketches of routes hereby attached, which have been distributed down to sections of squadrons, are to be reproduced in the form of tracings by the subordinate units mentioned in the above paragraph. This work must be completed by February 8th.

DOCUMENT NO. 6

EXTRACT FROM THE DIARY OF FRENCH LIEUTENANT
DOLLFUSS

[Translation]

11th November	9.30	Fight in a clearing. (illegible)—sleep.
	11.00	Return. The Colonel informs me of my promotion to N.C.O.
17th December	9.00	Leave for Vressincourt. Duty in Verdun.
21st December		End of duty.
15th January 40	2.30	Alarm.
16th January		Reconnaissance of the positions in Bel- gium.
17th January		Leave for Pure.
11th February		Proceed on leave.

DOCUMENT NO. 7**STATEMENT OF A LUXEMBURG SUBJECT ON THE PRESENCE
OF FRENCH TROOPS IN BELGIUM BEFORE MAY 10, 1940****[Translation]**

Report of proceedings

taken down before Dr. Richter, General Consul in the presence of Captain Ruppert and the specially appointed officer v. Gareis, Army Command 12. Statement taken from Mr. Josef Grandjenet.

Personal details

My name is Josef Grandjenet, born in Harlange, Luxemburg, on December 28, 1866 (correctly, December 27,66), a merchant by calling. I am no longer in business and have lived for the past six months in Bertrix, 98 rue Burhaimont. I own a house in Libramont, rue Faubourg, and my permanent residence is there. For the present I am remaining here in Bertrix. I am a subject of Luxemburg, Catholic, widower. I can verify my statements by showing my identity card issued by the Commune Aubange.

Statement

I voluntarily declare on oath as follows:

About 7 days before the outbreak of the German-Belgian hostilities, that is to say, if I am not mistaken, Sunday May the 4th, or possibly the day before, about 200 French soldiers in uniform drove through Bertrix in the afternoon in armored cars coming from the south, and drove off in the direction of Libramont. I definitely recognized that they were French soldiers because I know the uniform exactly. Apart from that I recognized the soldiers by their language when they conversed with me.

Bertrix, May 15, 1940.

concluded:

(signed) Grandjenet J.
Richter, General Consul
Ruppert,
v. Gareis

DOCUMENT NO. 8**STATEMENT OF A FRENCH PRISONER OF WAR ON THE
PRESENCE OF FRENCH TROOPS IN BELGIUM BEFORE
MAY 10, 1940****[Translation]**

Report of Wireless Operator Walter Dick.

O. U. May 16, 1940.

Re Statement of a French prisoner of war.

On May 12, 1940, I traveled with a motorcycle dispatch rider from Bertrix to Bastogne. At Recogne a destroyed railway bridge stopped us. Five French prisoners of war belonging to a tank unit were standing at the bridge. One of these prisoners addressed me in German and told me that for a whole day they had been encamped in a house to the left of the bridge and that no one had worried about them. In the course of the conversation and in reply to my question, how long they had been in Belgium, he answered: "Since the 15th of last month." Two infantry and anti-aircraft Lieutenants were witnesses to this conversation from time to time. I cannot say definitely that both officers took full notice of the remarks of this French prisoner of war. Besides August Picker, the motorcycle dispatch rider, one other German soldier was present, who expressed his astonishment at the statement made.

I am prepared to confirm the above statement on oath.

(signed) Walter Dick,
Wireless Operator.

August Picker, the motorcycle dispatch rider, Unit 18330, declared:

I have heard the statement made by the French prisoner of war and am also prepared to confirm same on oath.

(signed) August Picker,
Senior Wireless Operator.

DOCUMENT NO. 9

**MEMORANDUM BY THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE 9TH
FRENCH ARMY ON THE INTENDED MOVEMENT OF BELGIAN
TROOPS EAST OF THE MEUSE, MARCH 28, 1940**

[Translation]

Secret

**CE/BA
9th Army.
General Staff
2 Office**

This draft must not leave
the Offices of the General
Staff of the 9th Army.

No. 1748/2

Headquarters, March 28, 1940.

Memorandum Covering the Intended Belgian Movements
East of the Meuse

The intended Belgian movements east of the Meuse (Note No. 634/2 S. of March 19) give rise to the following remarks:

I—Retardative movement

1) Withdrawal of the Chasseurs Ardennais

—3rd and 2nd Chasseurs: Mobility possible on condition that the work of demolition in the sector of the 3rd Chasseurs Ardennais is carried out completely.

—1st Chasseurs: Withdrawal to NEUFCHATEAU and LIBRAMONT possible, where in fact preparations for receiving them have been made. Further withdrawal to HUY (70 km as the crow flies, at right angles to the enemy march-route and in the normal direction of the withdrawal of the civilian population) appears to be more than problematical.

It is probable that the retiring units of the 1st Chasseurs would be compelled to retire in the direction of SEMOY.

- 2) With drawal of the detached units of the 2nd Lancers from the direction of FLORENVILLE

—Same remarks as above.

- 3) Defense of the "Bridgehead of HUY." The 1st Cav. Div. (reinforced by 2 battalions of Chasseurs Ardennais) has to defend a front of 30—40 km in length

These defense operations can be based on:

- In the east, the OURTHE valley.
- In the center, an anti-tank trench.
- In the west, the HOYOUX valley.

Considering the extension of the front, the defense operations should not be prolonged more than 24 hours provided that the chain of the old LIEGE forts has not been previously pierced.

- 4) Command of Group K

Situated at St. HUBERT in a very advanced position, this group will have to withdraw 60 km at right angles to the enemy, in order to reach the MEUSE.

The group will be constantly in motion and not in a position to issue orders.

II—Supporting units on the river Meuse

- 1) Fortified position at LIEGE

Numerical units weak: 2 infantry divisions, reinforced by light units along a front of approximately 40 km.

Notwithstanding the support offered by the fortifications, this arrangement does not make allowance for the formation of reserves.

- 2) Sector of the 1st Division of the Chasseurs Ardennais

Normal sector of 8 km with the use of the MEUSE Valley, but the Division runs the risk of not being able to be regrouped. In any case, one cannot count on serious resistance of units, who have carried through an extensive and difficult retardative action despite the cover and despite the support which they may have obtained from the OURTHE and from the deployed 1. Light Cavalry Division at the "Bridgehead of HUY."

3) Sector of the 1st Light Cavalry Division

The 1st L.C.D. is to hold a front of 7 km, with a force not exceeding four regiments.

The extent of this front does not appear excessive in view of the importance of the obstacle. But it seems hardly probable that this division can become reengaged on the MEUSE after having held the "Bridgehead of HUY" for any length of time.

Its use as part of the reserve unit would have been advisable.

4) Sector of the 2nd Div. of the Chasseurs Ardennais

This division, which from the first is to operate in the MEUSE valley will be capable of offering serious resistance along its front of 5 km.

5) Fortified position of NAMUR

This position appears to be better defended than that of LIEGE:

1 Division supported by the fortifications on an effective front of approximately 15 km on the right bank of the MEUSE.

6) Meuse, south of NAMUR

—Undefined.

DEDUCTION

If we disregard the undefended sections up-stream from NAMUR, it would appear that the weak point of the Belgian MEUSE defenses is the sector lying between the HUY and the fortified position of LIEGE, because the troops charged with the defense of this sector would be exhausted, and would go into action at the last moment.

It furthermore appears that no reserves of any serious account seem to have been provided in the rear of the rallying position of LIEGE—NAMUR.

DOCUMENT NO. 10**ORDERS CONCERNING INFORMATION ABOUT FRIENDLY TROOPS AND ERECTION OF A FORTIFIED POSITION, ISSUED BY THE 2ND BELGIAN GRENADIER REGIMENT, APRIL 13, 1940**

[Translation]

2nd Grenadier Regiment

In the Field, April 13, 1940.

Regimental Staff**Secret****No. 2463/567**

The Commander of the 2nd Grenadiers to:

the Battalion Commanders (5 copies)
 the Commander of the Staff Company
 the Regimental Surgeon
 the Wireless Officer
 the Intelligence Officer
 the Commander of the Reconnaissance
 Section

ORDER FOR CONSOLIDATING AND DEFENDING THE POSITION HAL—CASTRE—PAMEL

(Supplementary to my order No. 2453/565 of April 12, 1940)

I. Information concerning friendly troops—

Friendly forces will occupy a general front in the direction of TOURNAI—ANTOING—CANAL FROM MONS TO CONDE—ST-GHISLAIN—BINCHE.

II. Task of the 7th Inf. Div.

In conjunction with the VI. A.C., the 7th Infantry Division, which at the left joins with 2nd Infantry Division, has orders to prepare for the occupation of the NIOVE—CASTRE—HAL position.

- Note: 1. Cyclist units of the 7th Inf. Div. have reconnoitered the crossings over the river DENDRE between OKEGEM (excluded) and ALOST (included).
2. Occupation of the dug-outs and the placing of anti-tank guns 47 has been completed since April 11.

III. Frontiers

Of S—Sector: see sketch accompanying Order No. 2453/565.
Between battalions: the same.

IV. Structure ¹ . . .

V. Directions for carrying out work

- a) Work in the field will be carried out in the following order of urgency:
- 1) —Preparing a field of fire; camouflage;
 - 2) —Obstacles;
 - 3) —Erection of protected positions for riflemen.

As far as possible, use must be made of all facilities already available.

- b) Contingent improvements to the already existing position.

It has been established that in consequence of the construction of tank-traps after the establishment of the position, certain points on its fringe no longer coincide with the conditions bearing on firing distances (200—300m) and flanking.

Furthermore a few of the trenches dug in low-line areas have become flooded and useless. Therefore, it is necessary, before this work is undertaken, that an investigation be held for the purpose of ascertaining these details and correcting the contours of the line which no longer conforms to present requirements.

- c) The work.

1. Clearing the field of fire.

Preparations for an uninterrupted and clear field of fire capable of giving utmost efficiency, must be strictly limited to absolutely necessary work. Camouflage must not be overlooked.

It should not be overlooked that national camouflage is the better. Special attention should, therefore, be given to this work in wooded areas.

¹ See facsimile p. A16.

2. Wire-entanglements.

A wire-network 4.30 m wide, must be put in place; any existing net work must be made use of or supplemented.

Isolated dug-outs, or such projecting from the position must be enclosed by a 4.30 m wire-entanglement.

3. Protected infantry positions.

All available infantry positions, if suitable, must be improved. Breast-works must be erected at first, and on their completion, trenches must be built.

Trench walls must be lined in the first place with the following materials:

—Cut turf

—Revetments from material found on the spot

—Wire netting

On erecting the parados and covering same attention must be paid to sufficient slope, which however should not exceed 8:1 with revetments, 6:1 with turfs.

4. Light Dug-outs.

Light trenches are at present not being reinforced except that those already built can be used. But during the course of field work sufficient space must be reserved.

5. Listening and observation posts.

Certain parts of the tank-obstructions are placed near houses or other places of cover which give easy access; on the other hand, there are certain points of importance the occupying of which, if not during day time, are at least essential to guard by night. Near such points outlying posts (listening or observation posts) may be built, places for which should be prepared; special instructions will immediately settle this question.

d) Execution of work.

Work will commence on the morning of April 13. Due to their late arrival, the 2nd Grenadiers will only execute the work already planned and prepared in the course of the 12th. Until further orders work will be carried out daily including Sundays. Sectional leaders will be held responsible that all ranks are given the opportunity of attending Divine Service.

Report of work done must be submitted to me at 14 hours by April 15th (enclosed form to be used).

22 ALLIED INTRIGUE IN THE LOW COUNTRIES

e) Supplies

—See Order No. 2456/566 re maintenance and withdrawal as from April 12, 1940.

VI. Security.

(a) On alarm being given, regimental reconnaissance units will post guards at the following places:

—The 2nd Grenadiers towards STEENHAULT (milestone 9 road from NINOVE to ENGHIEU); guarding the district of ENGHIEU.

—The 2nd Mounted: toward HAUTE-CROIX; guarding the district of ENGHIEU.

(b) In order to make themselves acquainted with the battle area, the reconnaissance party of the 2nd Grenadiers will daily send patrols to the neighborhood of the aforementioned posts and will explore the possibility of withdrawal.

Commander of the 2nd Grenadiers
(sgd) HERBIET
Colonel on General Staff

DOCUMENT NO. 11

ORDER CONCERNING PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES IN BELGIUM ISSUED BY THE 2ND BRITISH DIVISION, APRIL 19, 1940

Secret

2 Div 202/1/G/1
19 Apr 40.

4 Inf Bde (1)
5 Inf Bde (1)
6 Inf Bde (1)
4/7 D.G. (1)
R.A. (1)
R.E. (1)
R.A.S.C. (1)
Pro (1)
F.S.P. (1)
F.L.O. (1) A/Q (letter only).

1. Contact with Belgian civil authorities.

- (a) The first contact in any Belgian village should be with the Burgomaster, the second with the local Brigade de Gendarmerie the headquarters of which will be found in the chef-lieu of the canton.

The Gendarmerie, as in France, are in possession of information on all inhabitants of the canton concerned.

Their duties and organization correspond with those of the French Gendarmerie; they are responsible for all matters regarding the recruitment of personnel into the Army, and for all questions of mobilization affecting the civil population. In co-operation with the civil police, represented in country districts by the Gardes Champetres, under the Burgomaster, they are also responsible for the maintenance of law and order.

- (b) At the earliest opportunity, arrangements will be made for representatives of the Surete Publique (the central Polico Intelligence Office) to be attached to G.H.Q. and Corps N.Q. The officials to be attached will be members of the State Police (Police Generale de l'Etat) who deal with internal security, subversive propaganda, and surveillance of foreigners entering the country.
- (c) Further details of Belgian Police and Gendarmerie organization are given in Chapter XV of "Notes on the Belgian Army 1937".

2. Pigeon Lofts.

The doors of all pigeon lofts will be opened and kept open. Pigeon racing is a national sport in Belgium and F.S.P. will ensure that this instruction is carried out over as wide an area as possible, irrespective of whether the Belgian authorities have issued an order to the same effect or not.

3. Belgian Identification papers.

Specimens of Belgian identity cards are enclosed (distribution as above). The cards enclosed are only approximate reproductions of the originals both as to colour and print. At the earliest opportunity after crossing the frontier, information should be obtained from Belgian sources on the following points:

- (a) That other permits, if any, are in current use.
(b) The scope of the specimens enclosed.

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4. Suspect cars and persons.

- (a) A list of suspect cars giving the owner's name and the number of the car is given in Appx A.
- (b) A list of persons whom the authorities should be requested to place under arrest is given in Appx B.

Lt. Col.
G.S., 2 Div.

DOCUMENT NO. 12

**ROUGH MAP OF MILITARY ROADS FOR THE FRENCH 1ST
LIGHT DIVISION IN BELGIUM**

[See facsimile in last section of this book, p. A20.]

DOCUMENT NO. 13

**ORDERS CONCERNING LIAISON WITH BELGIAN AND BRITISH
ARMY COMMANDS, ISSUED BY THE 1ST FRENCH MOTORIZED
LIGHT DIVISION, DECEMBER 18, 1939**

[Translation]
Secret

**1st Motorized Light Division
General Staff 3^o Office
No. 407 3 S.**

Staff Headquarters, Dec. 18, 1939

Special Orders for General Operation Order No. 17a

I. Liaison with Army Commands

1. Advance up to the Canal.

a) In the vanguard with Belgian troops

By means of Reconnaissance Section with the General Staff of the fighting force in the fighting sector of the 1st M. L. Div.
By means of the Commander of the 2. Section of the General Command with the Belgian General Staff in BRUSSELS;

from SOIGNIES (Town Hall) accompanied by a patrol of the 6th Cuirassiers. (1 unit Armored Reconnaissance Cars, 1 unit Motorized Infantry). Transmission of reports to advanced Divisional Command (at Headquarters of the Reconnaissance Commander), by means of dispatch rider, wireless, or if possible telephone.

- b) On the flanks. With the 2nd. M.L.Div. through the Liaison Officer of the 1st L.Div., Lt. HUET, at Headquarters of the 2nd M.L.Div.

With the British Forces (2nd British Division or Hotblack 4/7th Dragoons) . . .¹

If necessary, with the Belgian Forces operating in the south or western part of BRUSSELS, by flank guard.

In the rear with the General Command: Liaison Officer of the General Command . . .

- c) Internal Liaison

2. At the Canal . .

II. Tactical Liaison

Assure all echelons from right to left.

1. Advance up to the Canal.

- a) Canal reconnaissance in conjunction with the British; between reconnaissance section and patrols on roads 1₁ and 1₃ according to the judgment of the Commander of the 6th Cuirassiers.

- b) 1st Squadron between the marching columns in the MONS-BINCHE connecting sector.

Between the marching columns and the flank guard according to decision of the Colonel commanding March Column North.

- c) Flank guard with the British and if necessary with the Belgians as well (see above §1) . . .

2. At the Canal

- a) Long distance reconnaissance and protection . . .

- b) 1st Squadron with the 2nd M.L.Div. by means of miscellaneous posts . . .

With the British troops in the region north of TUBIZE by means of a liaison detachment of the northern protective flank positions . . .

¹ Suspension dots indicate omission. See facsimile, pp. A21 ff.

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If necessary, with the Belgian troops in the same sector and under the same conditions if they maintain their positions on the Canal.

3. East of the Canal . . .

III. Report to Divisional Headquarters

1. Advance up to the Canal

—By the Reconnaissance Detachment:

On crossing the Canal

On establishing connection with the Belgian troops.

If coming in contact with the enemy.

—By the 1st Squadron:

On arrival of the head of the column at the MONS-BINCHE road

On arrival at the Canal

And in the event of contact with the enemy.

—By the northern flank guard:

On establishing contact with the nearest troops

Or with the enemy.

—By the 2nd Squadron:

On arrival of the head of the column at the MONS-BINCHE road and on arrival at the Canal position

2. At the canal and eastwards . . .

IV. Fighting strength table . . .¹

General Picard
Acting Commander of the
1. Motorized Light Division
Signed: PICARD

DOCUMENT NO. 14

**MAP OF MILITARY ROADS IN BELGIUM TO BE USED BY THE
BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, APRIL, 1940**

[See facsimile in last section of this book, p. A24.]

¹ See facsimile, p. A23 and p. A24

DOCUMENT NO. 15

FRENCH ORDER CONCERNING LIAISON WITH BRITISH AND
BELGIAN COMMANDS[Translation]
Secret4th Motorized Rifle Regt.
No. 37/OP—

SPECIAL ORDER FOR LIAISON

(Extracts)

(Attached to General Operation Order No. 23)

I. HEADQUARTERS

Authority	Designation	Departure	End of 1st Phase	Approximate Date	Line of March
1	2	3	4	5	6
A. Superior or Parallel Authorities					
1st Light Motorized Division	Carquois	Fruges	Hyp. Dyle	about	1 ⁴
H.Q.			Tielem (10 km south of Turnhout) or Duffel 8 km north of Malines	H + 12	
Advanced H.Q.			Hyp. Breda	H + 10	
H.Q. in rear			Oostmalle (15 km west of Turnhout) with the reconnaissance	H + 12	
	Zephirin-Marcel	"	with the base		1 ⁴
	Zephirin-Raoul	"			1 ⁴
3rd Brit. Div.	Fene	Lesquin	not fixed	H + 14	{ Lannoy—Roubaix Wattreloss Espierres—Audenarde Alost Droehout Vilvorde—Perck Louvain
15/19 Hussars		Camprin	not fixed	H + 8h. 30	{ Seclin Roubaix—Wattreloss—Espierres—Audenarde— Alost—Droehout— Vilvorde— Perck—Louvain

B. Subordinate Authorities

1st section Group. Col. Cau- sans	Etienne Francois	L'Abeelee	Hyp. Dyle Kasterlee or Heerzel	H + 12	1 ⁴
			Hyp. Breda Oud-Turnhout	H + 13	

II. COMMAND LIAISON

a) Advance with the Belgian and Dutch Forces

H. Q.	Location	Personnel	Means of Liaison	Provided by
Belgian G.H.Q.	Haacht ¹ Turnhout	1 Officer of the 2nd Lt. Mot. Div.	2 motorcyclists, one of which with sidecar	4th Mot. Rif. Regt. Lt. de Lafforest (13th Squadron)
Belgian Div.		1 Officer of the 2nd Lt. Mot. Div.	1 transmitter 27, 2 side- cars with drivers	transmission 4th Mot. Rif. Regt. 2nd Lt. Mellet (8th Squadron)

¹ On the Dyle between Malines and Aarschot.

These officers will proceed with the reconnaissance detachments on the routes passing nearest to the places mentioned. They will receive special instructions from H.Q. of this 4th Mot. Rif. Regt . . .¹

LIAISON PROVIDED BY THE 3RD BRIT. INF. DIV.

Sections	Personnel	Means of Liaison	Remarks
Between H.Q. of 15/19th Hussars and the Commander of Group No. 2	1 officer (1) 1 interpreter 2 contact-men	1 car 2 motorcycles	(1) if required

...

III. TACTICAL LIAISON

Provided for all sections from left to right 1st section—between the groups and sub-groups on arrival at the transverse lines:

TERNEUZEN—GHENT— AUDENARDE	} One officer of the 7th squadron and if required one section of motor- cycles. One section armored reconnaissance cars for reconnaissance of: LANDIN—WALSCH— LESEINDE—
ANTWERP—HEMIKSEM	
—BOOM—MALINES	
TILBURG—TURNHOUT	

¹ Suspension dots indicate omission. See facsimile, pp. A26 ff.

With the 3rd Brit. Inf. Div.

By Group No. 2 —Between GAVERE & ASPER —North of VILVORDE —At ARRSCHOTT ¹	}	To be provided by the Commander of the 3rd Bat. 1 officer and if required 1 platoon rifleman.—
--	---	---

IV. REPORTS TO THE H.Q. LT. MOT. DIV.

Air observation: see special order for anti-aircraft action.

1st section: On arrival of heads of columns at the following tranverse lines:

TERNEUZEN—GHENT— AUDENARDE ANTWERP—MALINES PUTTE—MERKSEN— ALBERT Canal ROSENDAEL—OOST MALLE-HERENTHALS TILBURG—TURNHOUT —MOL	}	To be provided by the staff of the 4th Mot. Rif. Regt.—
--	---	--

...

V. OPERATION OF TRANSMISSION SYSTEMS:

a) Transmission by wire:

During the course of the advance use will be made of the Belgian telephone system and if necessary of the Dutch. At the end of the advance the existing organization will be seized, only allowing the minimum for local requirements (to be arranged with the local administration)

...

b) Transmission by radio:

It is absolutely forbidden to employ radio at the starting points. Permission for the use of transmitters:

1. Immediately on departure for the aircraft observation and in the event of meeting the enemy.
2. From the tranverse line: TERNEUZEN—GHENT—AUDENARDE, onwards, for general use.

c) ...

VI. ...

¹ Misspelled in facsimile.

DOCUMENT NO. 16**OPERATION ORDERS CONCERNING THE OCCUPATION OF THE ISLANDS IN THE DUTCH PROVINCE OF ZEELAND, ISSUED BY THE COMMANDER OF A SPECIAL FRENCH DETACHMENT**

[Translation]

OPERATION ORDER NO. 1**I. Disposal of group—**

3 sub-groups:

D'ASTAFORT, D'ARODES, VONDERHEYDEN,

1 reserve-group directly under command of the Commander Michel de TOUCHET.

1 battery of 25 mm anti-aircraft guns, directly under the leader of the group.

II. Orders to the Group—

WALCHEREN and SOUTH BEVERLAND to be occupied before arrival of the enemy.

If necessary to dislodge him and to hold the place under all circumstances until the arrival of infantry.

Main Object:

The island of WALCHEREN; with the following important points: FLUSHING, docks and aerodrome, Seaplane base at VEERE, Villages WESTKAPELLE, DOMBURG, VROUWEPOLDER and ARNEMUIDEN.

Protection from the east:

Canal SOUTH BEVERLAND,
Straits and aerodrome of WOENSDRECHT.**III. Plans of the Commander of the Group—**

To get in touch with the enemy as soon as possible by marching on without delay and without considering the flank connection up to the South bank of the SCHELDT Canal. (Reaching the canal at the most in 4 hours after crossing the Belgian frontier.)

At the same time using all means for crossing (ferries, boats and the Isthmus of WOENSDRECHT).

Positioning the main body of the troops (7 squadrons) on WALCHEREN. With the remainder (2 squadrons) plus groups of machine-guns and accompanying arms) under all circumstances to hold the Canal of SOUTH BEVERLAND. Covering troops have orders to prevent armored cars from making use of the Isthmus of WOENSDRECHT and to prevent, if possible, the use of the aerodrome.

Under no circumstances should troops be split up.

For each sub-group:

- a) Guarding of the shore.
- b) Mobile detachments to be in readiness against landings and parachute troops.
- c) Hold ferries and ration dumps: BRESKENS—TERNEUZEN WALSOORDEN.

IV. Execution—

1. Sub-Group D'ASTAFORT (West):

Order: Crossing of the SCHELDT Canal near BRESKENS. Docks and aerodromes of FLUSHING to be occupied and consolidated. Reconnaissance over WESTKAPELLE and DOMBURG . . .

Additional Commands:

1st Motorcycle Rifle Squadron (Squadron de PEYERIMHOFF of the 2nd Corps Recon. Detachment under the command of Col. d'ASTAFORT at the northern exit of FURNES (NIEUPOORT Road).

2. Sub-Group D'ARODES (Centre):

Orders: Crossing of the estuary of the SCHELDT at TERNEUZEN.

Disembarking at BORSELLEN (if necessary at FLUSHING). Advance across the Isthmus of ARNEMUIDEN.

Occupy VEERE (seaplane base)—ARNEMUIDEN—reconnaissance over VROUWEPOLDER.

Retain connection with Sub-Group D'ASTAFORT at MIDDLEBURG.

Additional Commands: None.

3. Sub-group VONDERHEYDEN (East):

Orders: Crossing of the SCHELDT Canal at WAALSOORDEN.
Disembarking at HANSVEHRT.

The SOUTH BEVERLAND Canal to be held at all costs.

Push arms across the WOENSDRECHT Isthmus in order to support the covering troops crossing ANTWERP.

On the arrival of these troops utilize them in order to prevent armored cars from crossing the Isthmus and as far as possible, to prevent the enemy from using the aerodromes at WOENSDRECHT.

Additional Commands:

1 Motorcycle Rifle Squadron (Squadron PICARD of the 2nd Corps Reconnaissance Detachment).

1 Group 25 mm anti-tank guns (Group CHARVERIAT of the 2nd Corps Reconnaissance Detachment).

1 M.G. Section (mot.) (Group CARON of the 2nd Corps Reconnaissance Detachment).

All units under the orders of VONDERHEYDEN at the southern exit of DIXMUDE at the BOEZING road.

In addition, Commandant VONDERHEYDEN, together with Commandant LEMOINE is to regulate the march of the covering troops as far as ST. NIKLAS and on their arrival at WOENSDRECHT, to be responsible for their disposal.

4. Reserves:

a) At the disposal of Commandant Michel de TOUCHET:

1 Squadron of Motorcycle Riflemen (Squadron JOUSLIN).

1 Section 25 mm anti-tank guns (Group MONTIGNY).

1 M. G. Section (Sect. LELEU).

b) 1 battery of anti-aircraft guns (25 mm).

Reserves will follow via road No. 2 as far as IJZENDIJKE, where they will receive fresh orders.

V. Roads of Advance:

Road No. 1: Sub-section d'ASTAFORT:

FURNES — OSTEND — BRUGES NORTH — OOSTBURG — BRESKENS.

Road No. 2: Sub-section d'ARODES:

LOO—DIXMUDE NORTH—TORHOUT—BRUGES SOUTH—EKLOO—IJZENDIJKE—PHILIPPINE—TOR NEUZEN.

Road No. 3: Sub-section VONDERHEYDEN:
 POPERINGHE—BOEZINGE—EESSEN (excluding DIXMUDE)
 — LICHTERVELDE — TIELT — DEINZE — GHENT — ST.
 NIKLAAS—KEMZEKE—HULST—WALSOORDEN.

Covering troops will use road No. 3 as far as ST. NIKLAAS, they will then branch off in order to pass the SCHELDT Tunnel in ANTWERP.

They will rejoin via the WOENDSRECHT Isthmus.

VI. Marching-off position:

The Belgian frontier, Zero at H o'clock (will be notified later).

VII. Connections:

In the event of alarm, one officer per Sub-Group, also one officer from the covering troops, will proceed by a motorized signal-service vehicle to HONDSCHOOTE.

VIII. Intercommunication: see Special Orders.

Command of LESTOQUOI Group.

—Beginning: HONDSCHOOTE.

—En-route: BRESKENS.

—End: FLUSHING (Docks).

Roads of Advance:

Road No. 2, as far as IJZENDIJKE, then SCHOONDIJKE—
 BRESKENS.

IX. Anti-Aircraft:

The anti-aircraft battery commander himself will march with Colonel LESTOQUOI whom he will meet at HONDSCHOOTE.

He will hold himself in readiness to place a battery in position when crossing the BRESKENS Canal.

Later tactical employment: defense of FLUSHING harbor.

X. Naval Aircraft:

Defend crossing of canal and the disembarkation according to direct orders of the G.O.C.

XI. Ration Dumps and Maintenance:

First place of assembly for various units (workshops, tank-wagons, regimental transport): general line: SLUIS—EKLOO—GHENT (southern exit).

XII. Medical Service:

Wounded to be evacuated via DUNKERQUE.

XIII. Miscellaneous:

2 companies of infantry must be landed in the ordinary course of events at FLUSHING (by naval and air forces) before the arrival of the LESTOQUOI Group.

Should they not arrive this should not influence the LESTOQUOI Group's task. Dutch and Belgian units (latter from ANTWERP) will work in unison with the LESTOQUOI Group: Avoid mistakes.

The relations with civilians must be friendly but firm.

On their arrival the Sub-Group leaders will summon a representative from the local burgomasters and retain him. All requests in connection with care of troops will be made to him. Generally, payments will be made in cash in Dutch currency.

If necessary, requisition orders.

Beware of spies.

Lt.-Col. LESTOQUOI
Group Commander
(signed) LESTOQUOI.

DOCUMENT NO. 17

ORDER COVERING THE ADVANCE ON THE DUTCH TOWN OF BRESKENS, ISSUED BY A SUB-COMMANDER OF THE SPECIAL FRENCH DETACHMENT, NOVEMBER 15, 1939

[Translation]

Sub-Group D'Astafort

Command Bray-Dunes, 15.11.39.

Operation Order 1

I. General Situation }
Order } see Operation Order No. 1 of Group.
etc. . . }

II. Intentions of Lieutenant-Colonel d'Astafort, Commander of the Western Group.

1) To throw out a strong vanguard when crossing the frontier, the task of which would be to reach BRESKENS with all possible

speed and immediately to embark and cross the mouth of the SCHELDT under the protection of the air force and thus be in a position to occupy the aerodrome of FLUSHING.

2) To have the divisional reconnaissance detachment follow up in a sufficiently deep formation and to have it embark as soon as the vanguard has achieved a successful crossing.

3) To occupy the aerodrome of FLUSHING as soon as the first detachments have disembarked. To send out reconnaissance detachments toward DOMBURG, WESTKAFFELLE in the same measure as further troops arrive after their disembarkation and to take up liaison at MIDDELBOURG with the detachment from ARNE-MUIDEN.

4) To ensure the protection of the south bank at BRESKENS.

III. Formation

<p>a) Vanguard 2nd Squadron (mech.) 1 Machine-Gun section 1 Group 25 mm anti-tank</p>	}	Comm: Capt. des VILLETES
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Attached to 2nd Squadron:

1 Supply lorry . . .
1 Ammunition lorry . . .
1 Petrol lorry . . .
1 Workshop lorry . . .

b) Main Body:

<p>1st Squadron (mech.) 1 Machine-Gun section 1 Group 25 mm anti-tank</p>	}	Comm: Capt. MANGOU
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The same vehicles to be attached to the 1st Squadron as to the 2nd Squadron, and also the machine-gun and accompanying arms groups.

The machine-gun and accompanying arms groups will have the same vehicles attached to them; they will march at the rear of the main body of the divisional reconnaissance detachment excepting, however, the ammunition vehicles which latter may be positioned in the interval between the vanguard and the main body.

The Squadron of the Corps Reconnaissance Detachment to be positioned at the rear of the main body at the northern exit of FURNES. . .

- c) The Lieutenant-Colonel and the Staff Sections will march between the vanguard and the main body.
- d) Intervals
 Between vanguard and main body: 20 km ¹
 Between main body (Div.-Rec.-Detachm.) and the Squadron of the Corps—Reconnaissance Detachm.: 5 km.
- e) Formation at the end of the march:
 Vanguard in BRESKENS, where it will commence to embark.
 Main Body { Units of the Div.Rec.-Detachm.: KRUISDIJK ²
 Squadron of the Corps-Reconn.-Detachm.: in
 SCHOONDIJKE.

IV. Advance Route:

FURNES—NIEUPOORT—OSTEND—BRUGES Nord—OOSTBURG—BRESKENS.

V. Starting point:

Franco-Belgian frontier, on the road to Furnes

Starting time:

Vanguard: H o'clock

Main Body: H o'clock + 45 min.

Baggage: H o'clock + 1 hour 15 min.

VI. Embarkation:

By ferry. Vanguard to embark immediately after arrival at BRESKENS. As soon as the vanguard has reached FLUSHING, the main body, which will in the meantime have reached BRESKENS, will itself embark.

Protective measures for embarkation:

By M.G. sections of vanguard and of main body as well as by one section of the Squadron of the Corps Reconnaissance Detachment which after its arrival in SCHOONDIJKE is immediately thrown forward toward BRESKENS.

Once the entire Divisional Reconnaissance Detachment has effected the crossing, the protection of BRESKENS is to be entrusted to the aforementioned section.

VII. Anti-Aircraft Defenses:

On the march: } 1 Group at the head
 With each marching column } 1 Group in the rear
 While crossing: M.G. on the ferries

¹ Crossed out in the original.

² Crossed out in the original.

VIII. Orders for the Divisional Reconnaissance Detachment after its disembarkation at FLUSHING:

The vanguard is immediately to take possession of the aerodrome and there to take up a defensive position.

The vanguard will station one section and a party of naval engineers in the port of Flushing. These will protect the disembarkation of the main body.

The main body will also occupy the aerodrome and detach:

1 section of the Squadron of the Corps Reconnaissance Detachment at DOMBURG.

1 section of the Squadron of the Corps Reconnaissance Detachment at WESTKAFFELE.

1 section of the Squadron of the Corps Reconnaissance Detachment at MIDDELBURG.

The main body is to take up liaison with the Detachment from ARNEMUIDEN.

IX. Liaison:

As soon as the alarm has been given, 2nd Lieutenant KIFFER will proceed to HONDSCHOOTE by car, one motorcycle, and one motorcycle with sidecar in order to take up liaison with the LESTO-QUOI group.

X. H.Q. of Lieutenant-Colonel in command of the Sub-Group:

Initial H.Q.: BRESKENS.

Subsequently (after disembarkation): North exit of FLUSHING.

XI. Liaison:

With H.Q. of Colonel

XII. Main Baggage Column:

Not to proceed beyond SLUIS.

Drawn up in deep echelon, camouflaged.

XIII. Medical Service:

To march with the Colonel's Staff.

Signed:

Lieutenant-Colonel d'Astafort,
Commander of the Western Sub-Group.

DOCUMENT NO. 18

**ORDER CONCERNING THE ADVANCE ON THE DUTCH TOWN
OF BREDA, ISSUED BY THE COMMANDER OF A FRENCH
RECONNAISSANCE DETACHMENT, APRIL 17, 1940**

[Translation]

**Reconnaissance Detachment of 2nd Inf. Div.
Detachment for Long-Distance Reconnaissance.
No. 2/0
Secret**

Commanding Officer, April 17, 1940.

Advance Order No. 2
to replace and cancel Order No. 1, dated April 12th.

I. General Situation }
II. Special Situation } see °/809/GR dated April 15th.

III. Tasks for Reconnaissance Detachment:

A Reconnaissance Detachment of the 6th Cuirassiers as vanguard.

1. To advance in the general direction of BRUGES—ANTWERP—BREDA, as far as the crossroads:

I. BRUGES—OOSTKAMP

II. ANTWERP—MALINES

To Advance beyond each of these crossroads only after receipt of special orders from the Lieutenant-Colonel commanding the Long-Distance Reconnaissance Detachment.

2. In the event of coming in contact with the enemy, attack.

IV. Routes of March see °/809.

Reconnaissance Detachment, dated April 15th.

To halt automatically for 15 minutes each full even hour (refuel motorcycles)

V. Formation. . .¹

¹ See facsimile, p. A36, for V.

VI. Duties of Advance Guard:

- A. To advance as far as the crossroads mentioned under III, in order to reconnoiter
1. The crossings (especially across the BELGIAN positions on the Albert Canal)
 2. Beyond (Liaison on the advance route with the Reconnaissance Detachment of the 6th Cuirassiers)
To clear the road
To cover the main body while same is going into position during the various stages of its advance.
- B. If enemy is contacted to advise the Colonel commanding the Reconnaissance Detachment and to attack.
Under all circumstances to cover the main body once the latter has reached and is taking up its positions.

VII. Execution of Movements. . .¹

- IX. A special order will be issued concerning liaison and transmission. Important observation. All parts of the Reconnaissance Detachment of the 2nd Infantry Division must have passed by to the south of National Road No. 40 by H + 1.45 hours.

X. Rations: . . .²

Distribution:

- | | |
|---|-----------------|
| Captain commanding Armored Reconnaissance Cars for
Long-Distance Reconnaissance. | } For execution |
| Captain commanding 2nd Squadron. | |
| Captain commanding Machine-Gun and accompanying
Arms Groups | |
| Corps Commander, as report | |
| Captain commanding Main Body, for cognizance. | |

The Squadron Commander
Commander of Reconnaissance Group
(signed) Signature

¹ See facsimile, p. A37, for VII. VIII is omitted in the facsimile.

² See facsimile, p. A38, for X.

DOCUMENT NO. 19**MEMORANDUM CONCERNING COOPERATIVE ACTION TO BE TAKEN BY THE DUTCH, BELGIAN, BRITISH AND FRENCH ARMIES, SENT BY THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE DUTCH LAND AND SEA FORCES****[Translation]**

1 Enclosure

Memorandum

For the Extraordinary Minister Plenipotentiary of Her Majesty in Brussels.

Your Excellency is requested after taking cognizance of this memorandum to communicate immediately with the Belgian Government in order to inform it of the contents of this memorandum.

While awaiting the arrival of the plenipotentiary of the Commander in Chief of the Dutch Naval and Military Forces, Your Excellency can inform the Belgian Government that the Dutch Army is charged with the duty of delaying as far as possible the advance of the invader from the moment that he crosses the frontier.

The Command of the Dutch Army is seriously considering offering active opposition in the Peel Raam area lying in North Brabant (from Weert to Niederweert—Meyel—Helenaveen—Griendtsveen and Mill to Grave) by the troops stationed there, and has had considerable fortifications constructed in order to equip this position for such resistance. The Command must admit on the other hand that preparations to oppose German invasion into Holland have only been made on Dutch territory and that the importance of the position established in this region does not depend solely on its defensive power and the preparations already made, but is dominated to a large extent by the possibility of being outflanked on the south, that is near Weert and west of that city.

In view of the fact that the Command of the Belgian Army has stationed the main body of its troops on the Albert Canal, while according to the information at the disposal of the Command of the Dutch Army, only weak troops intended to hold up the enemy are stationed along the Meuse and the Zuid-Willemsvaart, the Dutch Commander in Chief considers the pos-

sibility that German troops will press forward on the other side of the Weert, i.e. toward Bois le Duc, to be so great that he feels himself forced to his extreme regret to withdraw the majority of his troops stationed in North Brabant while leaving rear guards north of the Meuse and Waal.

The Dutch Commander in Chief requests Your Excellency emphatically to draw the attention of the Belgian Government to the fact that everything has been done by Holland so to fortify the above-mentioned position Weert-Grave and to establish it in such a way that, in the opinion of the Dutch Commander in Chief, the Command of the Belgian Army may have complete confidence in the support offered it by this position.

The Command of the Dutch Army consequently hopes that the Belgian main line of resistance will lie along the Meuse and the Zuid-Willemsvaart, i.e. in the general direction of Eben-Emael to Bocholt.

The fact that the Command of the Belgian Army obviously did not desire this connection, forces the Dutch Commander in Chief to adopt a measure which he regrets extremely. The Dutch Army will offer stubborn resistance on the Grebbe Line (from IJsselmeer above Amersfoort and Rhenen as far as the Waal near Ochten). This line will be protected on the south flank by a line from Ochten to the North Sea: from Ochten to Tiel behind the Waal, from Tiel to the flooded area of Vesting Holland behind the Linge, and thence in the Merwede group and to the south of Vesting Holland. Moreover, Zeeland will be defended to the uttermost. The extent to which the Dutch Army can hold its own on the above-mentioned lines and in Zeeland will depend amongst other things on the strength of the invading German troops and on the help afforded it by the French and the British.

The plans of the Command of the Dutch Army will be explained by the plenipotentiary of the Dutch Commander in Chief.

I request Your Excellency to inform the Belgian Government forthwith that the above-mentioned lines as well as the positions in Zeeland are so organized and manned that if the French and British troops coming to their assistance can rapidly reach their positions, they would be able to offer the most desperate resistance. If this help is delayed, then, considering the length of the above-mentioned lines and the necessity of relieving the troops in consequence of the long duration of the war, the possibility will have to be envisaged of the Dutch troops being withdrawn into Vesting Holland. The Commander in Chief of the Dutch Army has expressly informed the French and British Governments that he would deeply regret such a measure from the standpoint of Holland itself, as well as from an international point of view. He draws their attention to the fact that the defense of the

Grebbe Line leaves open the possibility of advancing from this line at any given moment in order to proceed to an attack, whereas the encirclement of troops on the Grebbe Line would require more hostile forces than the encirclement of Vesting Holland. It is not necessary to enlarge upon the importance of holding the frontier of Zeeland. France is requested to keep an Army Corps of 4 divisions in readiness as a reserve to defend the interior of the country.

The British Government is requested to place at our disposal:

- a) a division supported by air force squadrons and anti-aircraft units to defend Zeeland.
- b) air force squadrons and anti-aircraft units for defending the interior of the country.

Both Governments are further asked whether they are prepared to employ bombing squadrons, if so requested, against the bridges which the Germans will throw over the Meuse and the Yssel.

Finally I would request you to inform the Belgian Government that if the Commander of the Allied Armies could decide to place considerable numbers of troops in North Brabant, the Commander of the Dutch Army for his part would be able to consider the possibility—according to the way the situation might develop north of the Meuse—of bringing into action a portion of his army side by side with the Belgian, or the British and French forces in these provinces.

Until such time as the plenipotentiary of the Dutch Commander in Chief of the Army and the Air Force has reported to you, the Assistant Military Attaché in Brussels will execute this duty. To regularize his position I am attaching hereto a sealed envelope which you will kindly hand to him personally and which will provide the Attaché in question with authority to act as plenipotentiary.

The Hague, March 23, 1940.

The General Commander in Chief of Land
and Sea Forces
H. G. Winkelman.

DOCUMENT NO. 20**BRITISH ORDER CONCERNING PREPARATIONS FOR THE
OCCUPATION OF THE NORTHERN SWEDISH ORE FIELDS
WITH NARVIK AS BASE, APRIL 6, 1940****Secret
Appendix A****Issued with Avonforce O.O. No. 1.
Role of Avonforce whilst in Norway****Role.**

1. The task of AVONFORCE is in[i]tially to secure the port of NARVIK and the railway to the SWEDISH frontier. While the force remains in NORWAY, its role is to provide for the security of the port, and of the railway against attack by German forces from SWEDEN, and sabotage or any other action by local hostile elements.

If opportunity offers, the Commander intends to advance into SWEDEN and occupy the GALLIVARE ore fields and important centres in that area. On no account will armed forces advance across the frontier without express orders from Force H.Q.

Considerations affecting the defensive measures necessary in NORWAY are dealt with below.

Possible enemy action.

2. Under the most favourable circumstances, (to Germany), the concentration of two German divisions in the GALLIVARE area early in May is possible, followed about a month later by two or three more divisions.

3. The distance from GALLIVARE to the NORWEGIAN frontier is 62 miles. Communications consist of a single electric line and a motor road as far as KIRUNA.

There is no road from the NORWEGIAN frontier to NARVIK. Under existing conditions, it is possible for a lightly-equipped force to operate between GALLIVARE and the frontier, but the main German advance must be astride the railway unless and until other communications are developed.

Under favourable circumstances, German forces might be expected to make contact with AVONFORCE on the frontier towards the end of May, after which pressure might increase progressively.

While local reconnaissance is essential before reaching definite conclu-

sions, it is believed that the difficult nature of the country about the frontier and in NORWAY itself may make military operations on any scale difficult for the enemy. Effective defensive action should not be difficult, subject to the improvement of communications.

4. No action by the Russian Air Force is envisaged, although some use of Russian aerodromes by Germany (e.g. OHTUA or KANDALAKSKA) cannot be excluded. Air action from Germany, except on a very limited scale, is not possible owing to the distances involved. A light scale of attack is possible from the end of April by squadrons using SWEDISH aerodromes.

Should, however, a German force be established at the head of the GULF OF BOTHNIA, aircraft could be operated from aerodromes in that area.

Effective air action is unlikely before early June. From then on, an ever-increasing scale of attack is possible. While the scale of attack on the NARVIK area is unlikely to approach that to be anticipated on the Western Front, active defence, dispersion, and proper P.A.D. measures are important.

Norwegian Army.

5. NARVIK is the Headquarters of the 15th Infantry Regiment consisting of three battalions. Troops in NARVIK itself are believed to number about 1500.

Most of the available accommodation and M/T at NARVIK are reported to have been commandeered by the Army.

6. In peace, the following are located at HARSTAD, 35 miles N.W. of NARVIK:—

Headquarters, 6th Division.

One Artillery Battalion.

One Engineer Battalion.

Troops can always be moved to NARVIK by coastal boats from HARSTAD at short notice.

7. An infantry regiment is normally located at TROMSO, 95 miles north of NARVIK, where there is also a seaplane station.

8. Although it may be assumed that no opposition will be met with from NORWEGIAN armed forces, as a normal measure of military security, the possibility of hostile action cannot be disregarded. Plans must therefore be made on this basis. If the active and effective co-operation of the NORWEGIAN forces can be secured, it should be possible to reduce considerably the number of AVONFORCE troops who would otherwise be required for internal security, coast-watching, and other duties.

The defence of NORWEGIAN naval and military establishments should normally be left to their own garrisons, unless our assistance is necessary and acceptable.

Civil Population.

9. Whether or not the reception of AVONFORCE is friendly, certain hostile elements will have to be reckoned with. There is a German population in NARVIK, and a Communist element. Either may attempt, by sabotage or otherwise, to hinder operations. Provision must therefore be made for the protection of vulnerable points on the railway and in NARVIK itself.

NARVIK.

10. Three or four small calibre guns (3- or 4-inch) are reported to be located on the high ground above the ORE QUAY.

There is a high wireless mast in the same area.

A number of A.A. guns have been reported.

There also appears to be a small fortified post on the rock behind the RAILWAY QUAY.

11. The most important points which will require protection in NARVIK against sabotage are:—

(a) The quays.

(b) Railway and rolling stock.

(c) The power stations at:—

NYGAARDS —8 miles E.N.E.

HAADVIDAL —3 miles S.

NARVIK —British Company's reserve Diesel Plant.

12. In addition to the above, the following may also require protection:—

(a) The naval and military W/T stations communicating with the United Kingdom. These may be located on the high ground north of the ORE QUAY.

(b) Military base stocks of supplies, petrol and ammunition.

Railway.

13. The length of railway between NARVIK and the frontier is 23 miles. It is said to be prepared for demolition at several points, but there is no precise information about this. Owing to the fact that the railway clings to the side of precipices, and has numerous tunnels and frequent spots where large masses of rock overhang it, the possibility of damaging the line seriously is unlimited.

14. Tunnels and bridges are said to be guarded by NORWEGIAN troops, but it is probable that this is not being actively carried out.

15. The protection of the railway to the maximum extent possible is vital for the future operations of the force. It will therefore probably be necessary to locate detachments at four or five points along the line to provide guards and patrols. Strengths and locations must depend on reconnaissance and the extent of co-operation by NORWEGIAN troops in protecting the line.

16. Although the railway, generally speaking, is vulnerable throughout, certain demolitions might take months to repair, while others might be cleared in perhaps a week or so. In the first instance, technical reconnaissance and a sense of proportion will be of the first importance.

Demolitions.

The export of ore from NARVIK must be continued as long as possible. The execution of demolitions will therefore be guided by this consideration.

Troops available.

17. The force available at various stages to carry out the defensive role given in para. 1 will be:—

- (a) If the 1st Convoy is limited to one personnel ship—one infantry battalion (1st Scots Guards).
- (b) If the 1st Convoy consists of two personnel ships—two infantry battalions (1st Scots Guards and 2nd South Wales Borderers) and 3 Lt. A.A. Bty. battery.
- (c) After arrival of 2nd Convoy—24 Inf. Bde. and 3 Lt. A.A. Btys. batteries.

Responsibility for Defence.

18. Until further troops are available, 24 Inf. Bde. must be responsible for:—

- (a) Reconnaissance and defence of the frontier against enemy ground attack from SWEDEN.
- (b) The security of NARVIK and the railway to the frontier.

The first task will be reconnaissance of the railway and frontier and the security of NARVIK for the landing of troops and stores.

19. 3 Lt. A.A. Battery will be sited to protect NARVIK and the harbour in conjunction with N.O. i/c.

War Office.

6th April, 1940.

FACSIMILES OF ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS

DOCUMENT NO. 1

204° R.I.

SECRET

Le Commandant du Groupement
chargé d'opérer en
Luxembourg

n°3264/C

NOTE DE SERVICE

MODIFICATION A L'ORDRE DE REPLI

Le 2° Bataillon du 204° R.I. occupant la Ferme IRSIN au
reçu de l'ordre :

" Entrez en Luxembourg, départ urgent "

la section d'éclaireurs motocyclistes du 334° R.I. qui devait occu-
per cette ferme ne l'occupera plus.

Un motocycliste sera envoyé par le Chef de Bataillon Comman-
dant le Groupement pour donner l'ordre de repli au Lieutenant Comman-
dant la Section d'éclaireurs motocyclistes du 334° R.I. et qui pren-
dra l'itinéraire RODANGE LONGLAVILLE et se mettra à la disposition
de son Chef de Corps.

P.C. le 8 Mai 1940

Le Chef de Bataillon FENILLATRE
Commandant le Détachement chargé d'opérer
en Luxembourg

Destinataires :

Section d'éclaireurs moto du 204° R.I.
- - - du 334° R.I. S/C de M. le Colonel
Commandant le 334° R.I.
Groupe Franc du 204° R.I. S/C du Cdt du II/204
- - - du 227° R.I. S/C du M. le Colonel Cdt le 227° R.I.
- - - du 334° R.I. S/C - - - le 334° R.I.
Cdt de la 7° Cie S/C du Chef de Bta Cdt le II/204° R.I.
- - - 9° - - - le III/204° R.I.
Cdt des 2 S.M. de la C.A.3 S/C du Cdt du III/204° R.I. (2 ex.)
Archives (2 ex.)

A2 ALLIED INTRIGUE IN THE LOW COUNTRIES

DOCUMENT NO. 2

4ème Division Légère
14ème Brigade Légère
4ème Régiment
d'Artillerie-antiaérienne

20. 10. 1944

4

ORDRE D'OPÉRATIONS N° 1

Cartes utilisées : cartes au 1/50.000, cartes "ALCAZAR"

A - MISSION DU 4ème R.A.A. - Couverture du II° Corps d'armée (aile gauche de la 1ère Armée)

Le 4° R.A.A. (moins le 3ème Escadron char) renforcé d'un peloton de canon 105 anti-chars, d'un peloton de mitrailleuses du 14° R.D.P. et d'une section motocycliste du Génie, aux ordres du Lt-Colonel Cdt. le 4° R.A.A. en liaison au Sud, avec les détachements de découverte et la sûreté éloignée de la 1ère Armée, en vertu, avec les éléments identiques du Groupement de R.D. de la 11° Armée, puis avec le Corps de Cavalerie, reçoit mission :

- 1° - de couvrir les passages de la Meuse, entre HAYE et AMELÉ inclus, en se couvrant sur la ligne SART-BÉVÉ-AMÉLÉ-CHUPY-DOCKÈRE, et d'envoyer des découvertes sur JUMET et LAMÉ.
- 2° - de pousser une sûreté éloignée sur la ligne précitée, après l'arrivée des avant-gardes du 14° R.D.P. et la découverte de HAYE sur STAVEL.

B - OPÉRATIONS DU Lt-Colonel Cdt. le 4ème R.A.A.

- 1° - de porter le plus vite sur la Meuse, en occuper et tenir les passages, en portant son effort défensif sur l'axe NOUËL-GUMIÈRE-IVALL.
- 2° - Découpler au plus tôt la découverte sur les axes prescrits, avec effort sur l'axe Sud.
- 3° - assurer la sûreté éloignée sur la ligne fixée avec effort de résistance dans la partie Sud de la ligne impartie (CHUPY - DOCKÈRE).
- 4° - Refouler les détachements légers ennemis qui seraient par franchir la Meuse, et en tout état de cause, assurer la possession de la ligne des Observatoires LÈVES-RIJL, en interdisant les débouchés des bois à l'Ouest de la rivière.

C - ZONE D'ACTION DU 4° D.L.G. et ITINÉRAIRES I¹ et I² ; voir colonnes

- o - COMPOSITION DES COLONNES - o -

A - Le mouvement du régiment se fera en 2 colonnes utilisant les itinéraires I¹ et I², dans chaque colonne en 3 échelons : Découverte, Sûreté éloignée -

- 1° - COLONNE I¹ - aux ordres du Lt-Colonel Cdt. le 4° R.A.A. - Itinéraire I¹ -
 - D.D.2 (1 Peloton A.K.D. - 1 Peloton Moto)
 - 2 Pelotons Motes du 4° Escadron - 1 canon de 25.-
 - 1 T.C. 1 du Groupement.
 - 2° - COLONNE I² - aux ordres du Lt-Colonel Cdt. le Régiment sur l'itinéraire I² -
 - D.D. 1 aux ordres du Chef d'Escadrons Cdt. le 1er Groupe d'Escadrons (2 Pelotons motes du 2ème Escadron - 2 Pelotons d'A.K.D.) -
 - P.C. du Régiment - 1 Section motocycliste du Génie - 1 Peloton A.M.D. et 1 Peloton Moto (Réserve de découverte aux ordres d'un Officier à désigner par le Chef d'Escadrons Cdt. le 1er Groupe d'Escadrons)
 - 2 Pelotons motes du 4ème Escadron - 1 canon de 25 - 1 Peloton de mitrailleuses du 14° R.D.P. aux ordres du Capitaine Cdt. le 4° Escadron moto.
 - T.C. 1 du Groupement aux ordres de l'Officier de Détails.
- Le Peloton anti-chars, le Peloton de mitrailleuses et la Section motocycliste du Génie rejoignent MPA-SAVIGNA, dès l'ordre d'alerte.

...../.....

- 2 -

B - LIMITES ENTRE LES GROUPEMENTS - Carrefeur Sud de EPPE-SAUVAGE-FOURESBOMIES-DAUSSOIS-COMPIEGNE-Bois en FLENOY-ORAUX-Bois de NEFFE-Bois MARLY-RIVIERE, tous ces points au Groupement Sud.-

C - SURMÈTE.- Avant-Gardes assurées dans chaque colonne par I Peloton A.M.D. et I Peloton Mété.-

D - BOND N° 1 - Ligne GERPINNES-MORIALME-FLORENNES- liaison à assurer par les A.V.G. sur la transversale MORIALME-FLORENNES.-
BOND N° 2 - A.V.G. hauteurs en carrefeurs à l'Est de la Meuse, Gros : la Meuse.

Dés leur arrivée sur la Meuse, les A.V.G. chercheront immédiatement la liaison au Nord avec le Groupement de G.B. et la Région fortifiée de NAMURQ au Sud avec la I° D.L.C. en direction de DINANT.-

F - JALONNEMENT - FLECHAGE.- Assuré par chaque Commandant de Groupement par éléments météorologistes.-

G - POINT INITIAL - Sur itinéraire des 2 Groupements : la frontière belge. Heures de passage : fixées en fonction des ordres d'alerte reçus.

H - SERRE-FILE GENERAL.- Groupement Nord à désigner par le Chef d'Escadrons Cdt. le Groupement. Groupement Sud : I Officier à désigner par le Capitaine Cdt. le 4ème Escadron Mété.-

I - DEPARTAGE.- groupés en queue des T.C. 1

K - D.C.A. - Défense assurée à l'intérieur de chaque groupement par toutes armes automatiques et en queue de groupement par un groupe Mété du 4ème Escadron.

L - D.C.B. - Défense assurée par les A.M.D. ^{et sous ordres} du Groupement Sud par un canon de 75 en tête du T.C. 1 -

M - ECLAIRAGE.- En cas de départ de nuit : I véhiculaire en tête en tête de chaque Peloton en rame correspondante, autres véhiculaires en veilleuses ou falots.

N - DISTANCES DE MARCHÉ : 50m. par voiture
 100m. par Peloton en rame correspondante
 400m. par Groupe de 2 Pelotons en éléments correspondants.-

P - COMPOSITION ET MOUVEMENT DES G.C. 1 et 2.- ^{groupements et trams.} Voir tableau annexé.-

Q - Les Chefs d'Escadrons donneront tous ordres de détails nécessaires pour la constitution des groupements (Echelon de combat et T.C. 1) dans leurs cantonnements, puis pour l'acheminement de ces éléments dans la Région d'EPPE-SAUVAGE, enfin l'orientation des colonnes sur les axes de marche respectif en direction des points initiaux. Le Capitaine commandant l'E.H.R. fixera les emplacements de rassemblement des T.C.2 et T.R. En tout état de cause la route MOUSTIER- EPPE à SAUTIN ou RANCE devront être dégagées de tout véhicule dès l'ordre d'alerte.-

A4 ALLIED INTRIGUE IN THE LOW COUNTRIES

DOCUMENT NO. 3

4ème Division Légère
-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-
14ème Brigade Légère Motorisée
-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-
4ème Régiment
d'Autos-mitrailleuses

2^{ème} Escadron

EXTRAIT DE LA NOTL N° 202 S/4 DE LA 4^{ème} D.L.C.

I - REPARTITION INITIALE DES MOYENS ET MISE EN ROUTE -

a - À la disposition des Corps dans les Groupements tactiques-

T.C.I. renforcé par : Camions à vivres .
: Cuisines.
: Totalité des moyens de transport d'Essence.
: Totalité des moyens de transport de Munitions.

Mouvement avec le Corps .

b - Rassemblés par la Division-

T.C.I. (reste) T.R. Impédiments des Unités combattantes groupées par corps .

Mouvement réglé par la Division.

c - Poussées sur l'axe de Dépannage -

Atelier des formations motorisées (Trains exceptés)

Mouvement réglé par la Division.

II - RAVITAILLEMENT DES GROUPEMENTS -

J 1 & J 2 au matin .

Alimentation, reconstituer en essence et en munitions : assurée à l'intérieur des Groupements, conformément aux ordres des Cds de Groupements, avec les moyens existant sur le T.C.I. ayant fait mouvement avec les éléments du Groupement.

A partir de J.2 au matin -

Le reste des T.C.I., les Sections de distributions, des T.R. des Groupements et éventuellement des munitions seront poussés par les soins du Cdt de la Base, en principe sur les points de 1ère destination suivants :

4ème R.A.M. carrefour 1 Km Est de ARBRE.

III - REPARTITION DES MOYENS A PARTIR DE J.2. SOIR-

Dans la journée de J.2 les Sections de distributions vides rentreront à la base, accompagnées des véhicules des corps.

..../.....

- 2 -

destinés à entrer dans la composition des convois d'essence et des munitions qui sont constitués à la base.

Les A.C.2. sont regroupés et restent à la disposition des Côtés de Groupement.

IV- STATIONNEMENT A REALISER DERRIERE LA MEUSE -

B A S E :

Groupement des T.R.	: CHATELET
essence	: CHATELET
Munitions	: PESCHE

ATELIERS DES COMES :

Groupement 4^e R.A.M. : FALISOLLE

T.O.2.

Groupement 4^eR.A.M. : Région Est de ARDRE.

V - CIRCULATION -

a - Régulation -

Jusqu'à Rocade -CHARLEROI - PHILIPPEVILLE (R.I9) assurée par l'Armée.

Entre la Rocade .R.I5 et la Meuse, initialement assurée par la Division (D.C.R.)

A partir de l'arrivée des A.C. de la 5^eD.I.M. sur la Meuse par le 2^eme C.A.M.

b - Réglementation de la circulation -

La circulation est autorisée de jour et de nuit jusqu'à nouvel ordre dans toute la zone de la Division sauf restrictions suivantes :

Elle est interdite au cours des nuits des J.1 J.2.J.3.
J.4 - De 20 heures à 5 heures dans les jours de débarquement des Unités Motorisées. - Pour les convois de plus de 10 Voitures, sauf accord de l'E.M. de la Division.

Tous les convois adopteront une distance minimum de 100 M entre les véhicules en marche et à l'arrêt.

VI- ESSENCE -

Organisation du Ravitaillement -

Journée de J.I. : Ravitaillement à l'initiative des Commandants de Groupement et des Commandants de "Atachements isolés, sur les Dépôts civils Belges au moyen de bons spéciaux.

Des Bons II2 timbrés " ARMEE FRANCAISE" seront remis aux Corps avant le Départ, ils seront valables tant dans les Dépôts civils Belges que dans les Dépôts d'Armées.

.... /

A6 ALLIED INTRIGUE IN THE LOW COUNTRIES

- 3 -

Belges
-Dépôts civils de la Zone de la Division -

<u>Localité</u>	<u>Sté Pétrolifère</u>	<u>Capacité en hectolitres</u>	<u>Emplacement du Dépôt</u>
WAXMANS CHATELET	Alliance	6.000	Route N°221 CHARLEBOIS - NAMUR
NAMUR	Purfina	6.000	Faubourg de JANCHES route de Liège.
.....d°.....	Schell	700	Faubourg de JANCHES, route d'ENTRAIVES. —
WAVELLOT	Schell:	350	

MARCHE

MODIUM
Rense
Dout

DOCUMENT NO. 4

LE MAJOR GÉNÉRAL
 DES FORCES TERRESTRES

Quartier Général

GRAND QUARTIER GÉNÉRAL

ÉTAT-MAJOR

4^e BUREAU

2^e Section

N° 7.513 - 4/T.T.

au sujet du plan de transport V.F.

par voie ferrée
 via Belgique

Un plan de transport par V.F. en cas d'opérations en territoire belge a été établi, à la demande des armées pour les éléments qui leur sont affectés et dont la mise en route est automatique, en fonction du jour J I.

Ce plan a été établi en prévoyant que le jour J I serait défini par un ordre donné la veille avant minuit, les premiers départs pouvant avoir lieu à partir de J I, 18 heures.

Il est apparu que le système des enlèvements préparés en fonction d'un jour présentait trop de rigidité. En particulier, si la décision était prise dans la nuit d'un certain jour, les transports V.F. ne recommenceraient que le lendemain à partir de 18 heures. Il en résulterait dans ce cas un retard important des transports V.F.

Il a donc été décidé que le plan d'enlèvement de base resterait celui dans lequel la décision serait prise la veille de J I entre 18 et 24 heures, mais que si la décision était antérieure à 18 heures l'ensemble du plan de transport automatique, serait avancé, suivant les cas, de 6 H., 12 H., ou 18 H., étant entendu que le préavis minimum actuel aux troupes resterait inchangé.

Les Commandants des unités, dont l'enlèvement par V.F. est automatique en cas d'opérations en BELGIQUE, seront donc invités à garder une étroite liaison avec les organes du système régulateur (1) qui ont préparé leur enlèvement.

Ce sont ces organes qui préciseront à chaque unité, le cas échéant, si le plan prévu doit être avancé, et de combien d'heures, ou bien s'il doit jouer tel qu'il est prévu.

Pour le Général Commandant en Chef
 Les Forces Terrestres
 Pour le Major Général:
 L'Aide Major Général
 Signé: MANOTTAU

A8 ALLIED INTRIGUE IN THE LOW COUNTRIES

DESTINATAIRES:

.....
VII^e Armée
.....

(1) suivant le cas, Régulateur Général, ou Régulatrice de zone intéressée.

VII^e Armée
ETAT-MAJOR
4^e BUREAU
N^o 9280 - S I/4

Q.G. le 18 Avril 1940

SECRET

CORRECTION NOTIFIÉE.

1^o - Pour exécution en ce qui concerne la liaison avec le R Z. qui a procédé pour enlèvement à:

EI-DI

2^o - Pour information à:

ze

Arrivé: 18 AVR 1940
Ses No: 10558/c
Ret: AD

Les conditions d'exécution du plan faisant l'objet du Tableau V à l'Instruction N^o 7.996 S I/4 du 7 Avril 1940 seront indiquées aux grandes unités, commandements, et Direction de Services indiqués ci-dessus au paragraphe 2^o par les soins du Général Commandant l'Armée (E.M. - 4^e Bureau).

Le Général d'Armée
Commandant la VII^e Armée
P.O. le Colonel / Chef d'Etat-Major:

R. Oudry

Immédiatement à la connaissance du Général

46.11. April 1940...

Sélects

R. Z. Maychouck. A. 916 II

Tableau de Tracé de l'Établissement et de l'Établissement (Plan ...)

225 Documents

N ^o de l'Établissement	Description de l'Établissement	Effectifs		Établissement			N ^o de l'Établissement	N ^o de l'Établissement	N ^o de l'Établissement	N ^o de l'Établissement	N ^o de l'Établissement	N ^o de l'Établissement	N ^o de l'Établissement
		Ch.	Ch.	1	2	3							
1	48° 21' - EM. CRG. CHR (f.)	14	269	48	15	18	7 ^a	76	53	1	11	12	35 5 ^a
2	35° 44' - EM. CHR. CHR (f.)	9	206	157	2	23	1	76	"	1	11	12	35 5 ^a
3	18 6 - 633 (f.) - 1/2 - 1/2 - 1/2	21	431	24	11	17	1	76	"	1	11	12	35 5 ^a
4	107° 42' - EM. CRG. CHR (f.)	15	269	67	18	47	7 ^a	76	"	1	11	12	35 5 ^a
5	CRGZ. EM. CHR. EM. CHR.	9	259	290	4	4	2	76	"	1	11	12	35 5 ^a
6	48° 21' - EM. CHR. CHR (f.)	21	260	68	43	7	6 ^a	76	"	1	11	12	35 5 ^a
7	35° 44' - EM. CHR. CHR (f.)	6	145	124	1	23	1	76	"	1	11	12	35 5 ^a
8	CRGZ. EM. CHR. CHR (f.)	11	497	59	3	17	1	76	"	1	11	12	35 5 ^a
9	107° 42' - EM. CHR. CHR (f.)	13	234	22	46	9	6 ^a	76	"	1	11	12	35 5 ^a
10	35° 44' - EM. CHR. CHR (f.)	8	205	111	-	17	1	76	"	1	11	12	35 5 ^a
11	48° 21' - EM. CHR. CHR (f.)	21	224	22	43	13	1	76	"	1	11	12	35 5 ^a
12	35° 44' - EM. CHR. CHR (f.)	8	197	166	5	21	1	76	"	1	11	12	35 5 ^a
13	CRGZ.	4	123	144	-	24	2	76	"	2	11	12	35 5 ^a
14	107° 42' - EM. CHR. CHR (f.)	14	233	24	47	14	1	76	"	1	11	12	35 5 ^a
15	35° 44' - EM. CHR. CHR (f.)	7	144	106	-	17	1	76	"	1	11	12	35 5 ^a
16	48° 21' - EM. CHR. CHR (f.)	21	241	71	46	11	1	76	"	1	11	12	35 5 ^a
17	35° 44' - EM. CHR. CHR (f.)	5	143	143	-	19	1	76	"	1	11	12	35 5 ^a
18	35° 44' - EM. CHR. CHR (f.)	8	202	157	1	26	1	76	"	1	11	12	35 5 ^a

A10 ALLIED INTRIGUE IN THE LOW COUNTRIES

	<u>to</u>		
1	Comité d'inf.	- E. de la J.	48
2	Bras armée	- Caenn	125
3	Bras	- H. de la J.	95
4	Bras	- Caenn	117
5	Comité d'inf.	- Stuyves	420
6	Comité d'inf.	- E. de la J.	48
7	Bras armée	- Caenn	125
8	Bras	- Hay	120. J
9	Bras	- Caenn	117
10	Terronville	- St.	115
11	Comité d'inf.	- H. de la J.	48
12	Bras armée	- Caenn	125
13	Comité d'inf.	- Hay	120. J
14	Bras	-	117
15	Terronville	-	115
16	Comité d'inf.	- H. de la J.	48
17	Bras	- Caenn	125
18	Bras armée	-	117

DOCUMENT NO. 5

PIECE N° IV

ITINERAIRES

I/- ITINERAIRES (-2 Croquis joints-)

Que la D.L.M. doive marquer un temps d'arrêt sur le Canal de CHARLEROI ou au contraire se porter d'un seul bond sur la transversale WAVRE-GEMBLoux les itinéraires affectés aux différents groupements de marche restent les mêmes jusqu'à la Frontière Belge.

Ces mêmes itinéraires variant au contraire au delà de la Frontière Belge, suivant l'hypothèse envisagée .-

II- POINT INITIAL & HEURE DE PASSAGE - -

Les Unités faisant partie des différents Groupements de marche, s'engagent sur leur itinéraire aux P.I. et heure fixés ci-après :

POINT INITIAL	I ₁		I ₂		I ₃	
	IWUY (Entrée S.)		Carrefour O. St-EST		Sortie N.E. SOLES-MES	
HEURE DE PASSAGE	De jour	De nuit	De jour	De nuit	De jour	De nuit
Découverte	PARTENT A H+DE LEUR CANTONNEMENT					
Escs. Motos 42 D.P.	←-----→					
Escs. A.M.H 42 D.P.	←-----→					
I/42 D.P.	X + 05'	X + 15'				
III/42 D.F.			X + 0h.30	X + 1 h.		
II/42 D.P.					X + 0h.30	X + 1 h.

NOTA .- Voir pièce N° V - § II - définition des heures H & X.

III/- RECONNAISSANCES & ETUDES D'ITINERAIRES -:-

La reconnaissance des itinéraires II - I₁ - I₃ jusqu'à la frontière, doit avoir été faite par tous les Capitaines et Chefs de Peloton, Gradés orienteurs, dépanneurs, Chefs de Groupes de T.C. etc. en un mot par tous les Officiers responsables de la conduite d'une Unité élémentaire ou par les Gradés ayant à circuler isolément (Dépanneurs, orienteurs, serre-fils)

L'étude des itinéraires au delà de la Frontière devra être effectuée sur carte. Les croquis d'itinéraires ci-joints diffusés jusqu'à l'échelon Escadron, sont à reproduire sur Calque par les Unités subordonnées mentionnées au § ci-dessus.

Ce travail devra être terminé pour le 8 Février .-

A12 ALLIED INTRIGUE IN THE LOW COUNTRIES

DOCUMENT NO. 6

11 NOV.	9 ^h 30	Paris à Bruxelles via Amiens rencontre à Valenciennes - 4 heures
	11 ^h	Retour à Valenciennes en camion via un pont de 700 ft.
17-12.	9 ^h	Revue par Valenciennes Maye à Valenciennes.
	21-12	Fin de Maye.
15-1-4	2 ^h 40	Alerte.
16		Reconnaissance de positions en Belgique
17.		Revue par Pire.
19-2		Revue à Valenciennes

DOCUMENT NO. 7

STATEMENT OF A LUXEMBURG SUBJECT ON THE PRESENCE
OF FRENCH TROOPS IN BELGIUM BEFORE MAY 10, 1940

[No facsimile available.]

DOCUMENT NO. 8

STATEMENT OF A FRENCH PRISONER OF WAR ON THE PRESENCE
OF FRENCH TROOPS IN BELGIUM BEFORE MAY 10, 1940

[No facsimile available.]

DOCUMENT NO. 9

Etude relative pas totis del' Etat Major de la 1^{re} Armée

Q.G., le 28 mars 1940

CE/BA
1^{re} Armée

ETAT-MAJOR

2^{me} Bureau
N° 1748 12

SECRET

N O T E

sur la Manoeuvre belge à l'Est de la Meuse

La manoeuvre belge prévue à l'Est de la MEUSE (Note n° 6.54/2 S du 19 mars) appelle les remarques ci-après :

I - ACTION RETARDATRICE

1) Repli des Chasseurs Ardennais

- 1^{er} et 2^{ème} Chasseurs : Manoeuvre possible sous réserve que les destructions aient parfaitement joué dans la zone du 3^{ème} Chasseurs Ardennais.
- 1^{er} Chasseurs : Repli possible sur NEUFCHÊTU et LIBRAMONT ou existent effectivement des organisations.

Le repli ultérieur sur HDY (70 kms à vol d'oiseau et perpendiculairement à la direction de marche de l'ennemi et à la direction normale de repli des populations civiles) paraît plus que problématique.

Il est vraisemblable que les éléments en retraite du 1^{er} Chasseurs seront amenés à se replier en direction de la SEMOY.

2) Repli des éléments détachés du 2^{ème} Lanciers de la région de FLORENVILLE.

- 1^{ère} remarque que ci-dessus.

.....

3) Défense de la "Tête de Pont de HUY".

La 1ère D.C. (renforcée de 2 Bataillons de Chasseurs Ardennais) a à défendre un front de 30 à 40 kilomètres.

Cette défense pourra s'appuyer :

- dans sa partie Est, sur la coupure de l'OURTHE.
- dans sa partie Centrale, sur un fossé anti-chars.
- dans sa partie Ouest, sur la coupure du HOYOUX.

En raison de l'étendue du front la défense ne paraît pas devoir excéder une durée de une journée sous réserve que la ligne des anciens forts de LIEGE n'ait pas été préalablement enfoncée.

4) P.C. du Groupement K

Très avancé à St. HUBERT, sur 60 kms à parcourir perpendiculairement à la direction de marche de l'ennemi pour atteindre la MEUSE.

Se trouvera perpétuellement en mouvement et dans l'impossibilité de commander.

II - DISPOSITIF PREVU SUR LA MEUSE

1) Position fortifiée de LIEGE

Dispositif numériquement faible : 2 D.I. renforcées d'éléments légers sur un front de 40 kms environ.

Ce dispositif malgré l'appui de la Défense des Ouvrages ne permet de prélever aucune réserve.

2) Secteur de la 1ère Division de Chasseurs Ardennais

Secteur normal de 8 kms utilisant le fossé de la MEUSE, mais la Division risque de ne pas pouvoir y être regroupée. En tous cas on ne peut pas compter sur une résistance sérieuse de la part d'éléments qui auront mené une action retardatrice longue et difficile, malgré la protection que leur aura assurée à partir de l'OURTHE la 1ère D.L. déployée sur la "Tête de Pont de HUY".

- 3 -

3) Secteur de la 1ère D.C.

La 1ère D.C. doit tenir un front de 7 kms avec des moyens réduits à 4 Régiments.

Ce front ne paraît pas exagéré en raison de la valeur de l'obstacle, mais il est peu vraisemblable que cette Division puisse se rétablir sur la MEUSE si elle a tenu quelque temps sur la "Tête de Pont de HUY".

Son emploi en réserve eut été indiqué.

4) Secteur de la 2ème Division de Chasseurs Ardennais

Cette Division installée d'avance sur la coupure de la MEUSE peut offrir une résistance sérieuse sur son front de 15 kms

5) Position fortifiée de NAMUR

Cette position paraît mieux défendue que la position de LIEGE:

1 Division appuyée sur la Défense des Ouvrages pour un front actif d'une quinzaine de kms sur rive droite de la MEUSE.

6) Meuse au Sud de NAMUR

- Non défendue.

CONCLUSION

Si l'on excepte la partie non défendue en amont de NAMUR, le point faible de la Défense Belge de la MEUSE paraît être le Secteur compris entre HUY et la Position fortifiée de LIEGE du fait que les troupes chargées de défendre ce secteur seront des troupes fatiguées et installées au dernier moment.

En outre, aucune réserve sérieuse ne paraît avoir été prévue en arrière de la P.R. de LIEGE à NAMUR.

A16 ALLIED INTRIGUE IN THE LOW COUNTRIES

DOCUMENT NO. 10

2ème Régiment de Grenadiers.

En campagne, le 13 avril 1940. 7

Etat-Major.

S E C R E T

N° 2463/567

7842/40

Le Commandant du 2 Gr.

Aux Cds. de Pon. (5 ex.)

Au Cdt. de la Cie. E.M.Rt.

Au Major chef de S.S./2 Gr.

A l'Officier T.S.

A l'Officier le renseignements

Au Chef de ¹ n. Eclaireurs.

ORDRE POUR LA PREPARATION DE L'ORGANISATION AU N°
DE LA DEFENSE DE LA POSITION HAL - CASTRE - PAMEL

(Complément à mon ordre n° 2453/565 du 12/4/40)

I.- Reenseignements sur les groupes amies.

Des forces amies occupent une ligne générale jalonnée par TOURNAI - ANTOING - le canal de MONS à CONDE - St. GHISLAIN - BINCHE.

II - Mission de la 7 D.I.

Dans le cadre du VI C.A., la 7 D.I., ayant la 2 D.I. à sa gauche, a pour mission de préparer l'occupation de la position NINOVE - CASTRE - HAL.

Notes : 1.- La garde des points de passage sur la MENIRE entre (KEGEM (exclu) et ALOST (compris) a été mise à l'étude par l'Esc.Cy./7 D.I.

2.- L'occupation des abris et la mise en place des C.47 est réalisée depuis le 11 avril.

III.- Limites.

du S/Secteur : voir croquis joint à l'ordre n° 2453/565 entre les Bords : idem.

IV.- Dispositif.

A.- Les trois Bns. accolés, dans l'ordre (du nord au Sud) :

I, III, II.

Renforts : Jusqu'à nouvel ordre, la répartition des renforts du IV sera effectuée comme suit :

13e.Cie. (- 1 Pon.) au I

1 Pon./13e.Cie. au III

{ 5 C.47 au I

14e.Cie. { 4 C.47 au III

{ 3 C.47 au II

{ Le Cdt. de Bns. III

{ 1 Pon. au I

15e.Cie. { 1 Son. au III

{ 1 Son. au II

{ Le Cdt. de Bns. II.

B.- Artillerie.

1. Gpnt. d'appui du 2 Gr. : le II/12 A. (Sud de STRIJTHEN)

V.- Directives pour les travaux.

a) Les travaux d'organisation du terrain seront réalisés dans l'ordre d'urgence ci-après :

1) - dégagement du champ de tir et camouflage;

2) - travaux d'obstacles;

3) - emplacements de tir protégés.

En ce qui concerne les divers travaux, on utilisera autant que possible ce qui est réalisé.

- 2 -

b) Rectifications éventuelles de la position existante.

Il a été constaté que par suite de la construction de l'obstacle anti-chars, ultérieurement à l'organisation de la position, certains emplacements de la lisière extérieure ne répondent plus aux conditions de distance (2 à 300 mètres de l'obstacle) et de flanquement.

Par ailleurs certains éléments de tranchées, établis dans les terrains bas, sont inondés et inutilisables. Les travaux qui doivent être effectués seront donc précédés de reconnaissances de détail tendant à rectifier les parties du tracé qui ne répondent plus aux conditions actuelles.

c) Travaux.1. Logement du champ de tir.

Le dégagement du champ de tir sera réduit au minimum indispensable pour obtenir une bonne action des armes, compte tenu du camouflage.

Ne pas perdre de vue que le camouflage naturel est le meilleur en tenir compte pour les travaux à établir sous taillis notamment.

2. Travaux d'obstacles.

Etablir ou compléter en tenant compte des réseaux existants un réseau normal de 4 m.30 de largeur devant toute la position.

Les surs permanents qui se trouvent isolés ou en saillant devant la position (lisière extérieure) seront entourés d'un réseau de 4 m.50.

3. Emplacements de tir protégés.

Les emplacements existants seront remis en état s'ils conviennent. Aménager en lèxe urgence les bûchettes; les tranchées de tir et les tranchées de communication n'étant exécutées qu'après leur achèvement.

Les tranchées seront revêtues en utilisant en ordre principal comme matériaux de revêtement :

- les galets;
- les clayonnages sur place;
- le treillis métallique.

On veillera spécialement à insister sur la création des talus de tranchée et des revêtements à donner une pente suffisante qui ne sera pas supérieure à 8/1 pour les clayonnages et 6/1 pour les galets.

4. Abris légers.

Les abris légers ne seront pas construits à l'heure actuelle, sauf à utiliser ceux qui existent. Toutefois, leurs emplacements seront prévus dans la réalisation des terrassements.

5. Postes avancés.

Certaines parties de l'obstacle anti-chars se trouvent accolées à des maisons ou à des couverts qui en facilitent l'approche; d'autre part certains points présentent une importance qui légitime leur surveillance jour et nuit, tout au moins de nuit. Il conviendra de placer à proximité de ces points des postes avancés (postes de guetteurs renforcés) dont les emplacements devront être préparés; une instruction particulière règlera incessamment cette question.

d) Exécution des travaux.

Les travaux d'organisation de la position doivent commencer le 13 avril, au matin. Le 2 Gr. vu son arrivée tardive n'exécutera que les travaux reconnus et préparés dans la journée du 12. Jusqu'à nouvel ordre, ils seront effectués tous les jours, y compris le dimanche. Les Cds. d'unités prendront des mesures pour permettre aux hommes de remplir leurs devoirs religieux.

Un compte rendu des travaux effectués me sera transmis le 15 avril à 14 heures (Employer le modèle ci-joint).

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») Ravitaillement en matériaux.

- voir l'ordre n° 2456/566 pour les Ravitaillements et les Evacuations à partir du 12 avril 1940.

VI.- Surveillance.

a) En cas d'alerte, les Pons. d'Ecl. régimentaires détacheront un poste de surveillance avec mission d'information aux points ci-après :

- le 2 Gr. : vers STEENHAULT (B.9 route de NINOVE à ENGHIEU); surveillance de la région d'ENGHIEN.

- le 2 C. : vers HAUTE-CROIX; surveillance de la région d'ENGHIEN

b) Afin de se familiariser avec son terrain d'action éventuel, le Pon. d'Ecl./2 Gr. effectuera/journallement des patrouilles aux abords du point de stationnement fixé ci-dessus : il étudiera les itinéraires de repli.

Le Colonel B.E.M. HERBIET
commandant le 2 Gr.,
(Sé) H E R B I E T .

DOCUMENT NO. 11

SECRET.
3 DIV 202/1/G (I)

19 Apr 40.

4 Inf Bde (1)
5 Inf Bde (1)
6 Inf Bde (1)
4/7 D.G. (1)
R.A. (1)
R.E. (1)
R.A.S.G. (1)
Pro (1)
F.S.P. (1)
F.L.O. (1) A/Q (letter only).

1. Contact with Belgian civil authorities.
 - (a) The first contact in any Belgian village should be with the Burgomaster, the second with the local Brigade de Gendarmerie the headquarters of which will be found in the chef-lieu of the canton.
The Gendarmerie, as in France, are in possession of information on all inhabitants of the canton concerned. Their duties and organization correspond with those of the French Gendarmerie; they are responsible for all matters regarding the recruitment of personnel into the Army, and for all questions of mobilization affecting the civil population. In co-operation with the civil police, represented in country districts by the Gardes Champetres, under the Burgomaster, they are also responsible for the maintenance of law and order.
 - (b) At the earliest opportunity, arrangements will be made for representatives of the Surete Publique (the central Police Intelligence Office) to be attached to G.H.Q. and Corps H.Q. The officials to be attached will be members of the State Police (Police Generale de l'Etat) who deal with internal security, subversive propaganda, and surveillance of foreigners entering the country.
 - (c) Further details of Belgian Police and Gendarmerie organization are given in Chapter XV of "Notes on the Belgian Army 1937".


2. Pigeon Lofts.
The doors of all pigeon lofts will be opened and kept open. Pigeon racing is a national sport in Belgium and F.S.P. will ensure that this instruction is carried out over as wide an area as possible, irrespective of whether the Belgian authorities have issued an order to the same effect or not.

3. Belgian Identification papers.
Specimens of Belgian identity cards are enclosed (distribution as above). The cards enclosed are only approximate reproductions of the originals both as to colour and print. At the earliest opportunity after crossing the frontier, information should be obtained from Belgian sources on the following points:
 - (a) What other permits, if any, are in current use.
 - (b) The scope of the specimens enclosed.

4. Suspect cars and persons.
 - (a) A list of suspect cars giving the owner's name and the number of the car is given in Appx A.
 - (b) A list of persons whom the authorities should be requested to place under arrest is given in Appx B.

J. M. M. attached.
Lt. Col.,
G.S., 2 Div.

DOCUMENT NO. 12



DOCUMENT NO. 13

1^oDIVISION LEGERE MECANIQUE

ETAT - MAJOR - 3^o Bureau

P.C. , le 17 Décembre 1939

n^o 407/13-9
SECRET

ORDRE PARTICULIER POUR LA LIAISON

(Annexe à l'Ordre Général d'Opérations n^o 17 Bis

1- LIAISON DE COMMANDEMENT

1^o Mouvement jusqu'au canal

a) En avant avec les Forces Belges

- par la Découverte avec les E.M. des Troupes de Campagne opérant dans la zone d'action de la 1^o D.L.M. ,
- par le Chef du 2^o Bureau du C.C. à l'E.M. Général Belge à BRUXELLES , accompagné à partir de SOIGNIES (Mairie) par une reconnaissance (1 peloton A.M.D. - 1 peloton motos) du 6^o Cuirassiers (1) .
- Renseignements transmis au P.C. avancé de la Division (accolé au P.C. du Commandant de la Découverte) par des agents de transmissions, par radio et si possible par téléphone .

b) Sur les Flancs

- avec la 2^o D.L.M.
- par l'officier de liaison de la 1^o D.L.M. : Lieutenant HUET au P.C. de la 2^o D.L.M.
- avec les Forces Britanniques (2^o Division Eritannique ou Groupement Hotblack - 4/7 Dragons Guards et 12^o Régt. de Lanciers = dans les conditions prévues par la Note de Service n^o 406/1.5. du 18.12.1939 ;
- éventuellement avec les Forces Belges opérant au S. ou à l'O. de BRUXELLES par la flam-garde ,
- avec l'arrière
- avec le C.C. : officier de liaison du C.C.

Tous renseignements transmis au P.C. avancé de la Division (accolé au P.C. du Commandant de la Découverte) par agents de transmissions, par radio .

Utilisation éventuelle du réseau civil avec l'arrière .

...../.....

(1) Cette reconnaissance sera déposée au passage devant la Mairie de SOIGNIES par le Colonel Cdt. le 5^o Cuirassiers . Elle y attendra le Chef du 2^o Bureau du C.C. .

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c) Liaisons intérieures

- 1 officier de liaison par brigade plus 1 officier de liaison de la colonne Sud (1) au P.C. avancé de la Division .

2°-Sur le canal

Liaisons maintenues en place auprès des différents P.C.

11) LIAISONS TACTIQUES

- Assurées à tous les échelons de la droite à la gauche .

1°-Mouvement jusqu'au canal

- a) Découverte :- avec les Britanniques sur le canal
- contre le D.D. et les reconnaissances sur I1 , et I3 à l'initiative du Colonel Cdt. le 6° Cuirassiers ;
- b) 1° Echelon - contre les colonnes à hauteur de la transversale de MCNS
- contre la colonne N. et la Flanc-garde à l'initiative du Colonel Cdt. la colonne Nord .
- c) Flanc-garde - Avec les Britanniques et éventuellement les Belges (voir ci-dessus paragraphe 1)

2°-Sur le canal

- a) Découverte et Sécurité éloignée = avec la 2° D.L.M. région de SENEFFE (l'axe de D.S Nord de la 2° D.L.M. passe à SENEFFE) .
- b) 1° Echelon - avec la 2° D.L.M. par un poste mixte sous le commandement d'un officier de la 2° D.L.M. et comprenant un peloton motos de cette Division sur l'axe FAMILLEUREUX - SENEFFE et 1 G.C. moto de la 1° D.L.M. à diriger sur cet axe par le Commandant du s/secteur Sud ,
 - entre les s/secteurs à la charge du Colonel Cdt. le s/secteur Sud aux environs du confluent du ruisseau Mathieu ,
 - avec les Forces Britanniques dans la région N. de TUBIZE par un détachement de liaison de la flanc-garde Nord , aux ordres du Colonel Cdt. le s/secteur Nord ,
 - éventuellement avec les Forces Belges dans la même région et dans les mêmes conditions si elles tenaient le canal .

3°- A l'Est du canal

- Éventuellement avec le détachement de Découverte se repliant sur son axe , par les éléments de chars poussés en avant , à hauteur de la route BRUXELLES - LES 4 BRAS et aux abords immédiats de l'axe du D.D.1 .

...../.....

- (1) l'officier de liaison de la colonne Sud rejoint le P.C./D.L.M. à CAUDRY dès le déclenchement de l'alerte .

111) COMPTES-RENDUS AU P.C. /D.L.M.

- 1°-Mouvement jusqu'au canal
- de la Découverte - au passage du canal, puis à l'arrivée au contact des Forces Belges, éventuellement en cas de rencontre avec l'ennemi,
 - du 1° échelon : au passage des têtes de colonnes sur la transversale MONS-BINCHE, à l'arrivée sur le canal et en cas de prise de contact avec l'ennemi,
 - de la Flanc-Garde Nord : aussitôt entrée en liaison avec les éléments voisins ou au contact de l'ennemi,
 - 2° échelon : au passage des têtes de colonnes sur la transversale : MONS-BINCHE et à l'arrivée sur la position canal.
- 2°-Sur le canal et à l'Est :
- de la mise en place du dispositif
 - d'urgence de tout contact avec l'ennemi
 - de l'heure du franchissement du canal - par la Découverte par les éléments de chars
 - périodiquement : pour 7 heures C.R. de la nuit pour 16 heures C.R. de la journée

IV) P.C.

Unité	P.C. au départ	Axes	P.C. sur le canal	Observations
C.C.	St-QUENTIN	(A 132)	St-SYMPHORIEN (3 Kms. E. de MONS)	
1° D.L.M.	CAUDRY	LE QUESNOY-MONS SOIGNIES	SOIGNIES (1)	P.C. avancé BRAINE-LE-COMTE (1)
1° B.L.M.	CAULLERY	It. Cambrai (MONS-SOIGNIES) VALENCIENNES- MONS-SOIGNIES	BRAINE-LE-COMTE (1)	
2° B.L.M. Col. s/sec- teur Nord	VECSLY	(SOLESMES-VALEN- CIENNES-MONS- SOIGNIES-BRAINE LE-COMTE)	LA GENETTE (1)	
4° R.D.P. Col. s/sec- teur Sud	NAVES	(SOLESMES-LE QUESNOY-BAVAI MONS-ROEULX)	BAROUCHE (1)	
6° Cuir.	St-HILAIRE	(SOLESMES- VALENCIENNES- MONS-SOIGNIES- BRAINE-LE-COMTE)	BRAINE-LE-COMTE (1)	

(1) Téléphone à la Mairie .

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1V) P.C. (suite)

Unité	P.C. au Départ	Axes	P.C. sur le canal	Observations
Groupement HOTBLACK	WANQUELIN	ASQ-MACQUEGNIES- LA HAMAIDE -	LA HAMAIDE	
12 ^e Lanciers	SCQ	MESLIN L'ÉVEQUE- Bois de Leszines- MERBECKE	(regroupé à ENGHEN	
4/7 Dragons	DOUVIGNIES	TOURNAI-LEWZE, ATH	à chercher à l'entrée O. de ATH	

Me Général P I C R D
Commandant p.i. la 1^{re} Division de Liaison Mécanique

Pour Ampliation :
Le Chef d'E.M. :

Signé : EICARD



Esc. ANTI-CHARC.(f) / sans exécution

DOCUMENT NO. 14

MAP OF MILITARY ROADS IN BELGIUM TO BE USED BY THE
BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, APRIL, 1940

[See folding map on the last page.]

A26 ALLIED INTRIGUE IN THE LOW COUNTRIES

...2/.....

B.- AUTORITES SUBORDONNEES .-

<u>1</u>	:	<u>2</u>	:	<u>3</u>	:	<u>5</u>	:	<u>6</u>
I° Echelon	:	ETIENNE	:	L'ABEELE	:	H yp. DYLE	:	
GROUPEMENT	:	FRANCOIS	:		:	KASTERLIE	:	H + 12
Cl. CAUSANS	:		:		:	ou HEERZEL	:	I ⁴
	:		:		:	Hyp. BREDA	:	
	:		:		:	OD-TURN-	:	
	:		:		:	HOUT	:	H + 13

II.- LIAISONS DE COMMANDEMENT .-

a-) En avant avec les Forces Belges et Hollandaises

P.C.	Emplacements	Personnel	Moyens de liaison	Fourni par
G.Q.G. BELGE	WLAACHT (I)	I officier de la 2° B.I.M.	2 Agents de liaison moto dont I Side	4° R.D.P. Lt. de L'FFOREST (I3° Esc?)
DIVISION BELGE	TURNHOUT	I officier de la 2° B.L.h.	I Poste E.R. 27 ? Sides avec conducteurs.-	Transmissions 4° R.D.P. S/Lt MELLET (8° Esc)

(1) Sur la DYLE entre MALINES & MARSCHOT .-

Ces Officiers feront mouvement avec les détachements de Découverte sur les itinéraires ^{du} plus près des localités indiquées.-
Ils recevront des instructions particulières à prendre au P.C. du 4° R.D.P. -

ELEMENTS DE LIAISON FOURNIS PAR LA I° D.L.M. -

Echelons	Personnel	Moyens de liaison	Fournis par	Observations
Entre le P.C. de la I° D.L.M. et le P.C. de la 3° D.I.B. (W) P.C. Initial	S/Lieutenant BEGUIN BILLECOCK du 4° R.D.P. (I3° Esc.)	I Voiture T.O.	Q.G.	(I) éventuel lement
Axe: LANHOY-ROUBAIX WATTRELOOS-ESPIERES-AUDENARDE-ALOST-DROEHOUT-VILVORDE-PERK-LOUVAIN	B.C. BOURGEOIS (détaché D.L.M.): Chiffreur 3 Agents de Transmission	I Side 2 Postes E.R. 27 (I) 3 Motos solos	4° D.P. Cie Radio 18° Dra-gons.-	3° Btn dont I au P.C./DLM
Entre le Cdt. du Groupement 2 et le P.C. du 15/19 Housards P.E. Initial	Lt. PARMENTIER du 4° R.D.P. (4° Esc.) I Interprète I° Btn.-	I Side I Side	4° D.P. 4° D.P.	
Axe: LABASSEE-LILLE-ROUBAIX-WATTRELOOS-ESPIERES-AUDENARDE-ALOST-DROEHOUT-VILVORDE-PERK-LOUVAIN -	2 Agents de transmission	2 Motos solos	4° D.P. I° Btn	
	<i>Paris 6° Btn</i>			

FACSIMILES OF ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS A27

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Les détachements ci-dessus se présenteront au P.C. de la Division à PRUGES dès réception de l'ordre d'alerte ou de l'ordre de mouvement dans le cas où le mécanisme d'alerte ne jouerait pas .-

ELEMENTS DE LIAISON FOURNIS PAR LA 3° D.I.B. -

Echelons	Personnel	Moyens de liaison	Observations
Entre le P.C. du 15/19 Hou-	: 1 Officier (I)	: 1 Voiture T.O.	: (I) éventuellement.
sards et le Cdt du Groupe-	: 1 Interprète	:	:
ment N° 2	: 2 Agents de liaison	: 2 Motos	:
	: sor	:	:

Liaisons intérieures:

Un Officier de liaison par groupement de marche rendu au P.C. de la Division dès l'alerte N° 2 - (Aspirant VANPERMARK - 7° Escadron)

III.- LIAISONS TACTIQUES -

Assurées à tous les échelons de la gauche à la droite .-

1° Echelon- Entre les Groupements et Sous-Groupements

-à l'arrivée sur les transversales :

-TERNEUZEN - GRIND - AUDENARDE - ANVERS - HEMIKSEM - SOOM - MALINES - TILBOURG - TURNHOUT	{ Un Officier du 7° Esc. et éventuellement 1 Peloton Motos 1 Peloton A.M.R. à : (LANDIN- WALSCH - LESEINDE -
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Avec la 3° D.I.B.

Par le Groupement N° 2 - Entre CAVERE & ASPER - Au Nord de VILVORDE - A AARSCHOTT	} à la charge du Commandant du 3° Bataillon. I Officier et éventuellement un Peloton Fusiliers .-
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La liaison d'AARSCHOTT sera maintenue jusqu'à nouvel ordre et assurée par un Peloton de fusiliers- 3° Bataillon .-

IV.- COMPTE-RENDUS AU P.C./D.L.M. -

-du Guët Aérien : voir ordre particulier pour la D.C.A.-

-du 1° Echelon : à l'arrivée des têtes de colonnes sur les transversales suivantes:

-TERNEUZEN - GRIND - AUDENARDE -ANVERS - MALINES - -PUTTE - MERKSEN - Canal ALBERT -ROSENDAEL - OOST MALLE - HERENTHALS -TILBOURG - TURNHOUT - MOL	{ à la charge de l'E.M. 4° R. D. P.-
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En outre et indépendamment des renseignements sur l'ennemi prévus par les ordres de recherches, un compte rendu succinct sera adressé à la Division partir de G2 matin. sur :

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A28 ALLIED INTRIGUE IN THE LOW COUNTRIES

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- les évènements de la nuit pour 5 Heures
 - les évènements de la matinée pour 10H.30
 - les évènements de la journée pour 18H.30
- et faisant connaître:
- la situation tactique des Unités
 - les demandes et les pertes

{ Les Unités subordonnées
font parvenir ces renseignements à l'E.M. 4° R.D.P.
pour 4 H. - 9 H. - 17 H. -

V/- MISE EN OEUVRE DES TRANSMISSIONS -:-

a-) Réseau Fil

Au cours du mouvement il sera fait usage du réseau téléphonique civil belge et éventuellement hollandais .-

En fin de mouvement on mettra la main sur l'organisation existante en ne laissant que le minimum pour les besoins locaux (entente à réaliser avec l'Administration locale).-

Il ne sera déroulé de fil qu'après stabilisation et avec la plus stricte économie .-

Exploitation: Pour assurer le secret il sera fait emploi pour la demande des communications téléphoniques des indicatifs prévus dans l'ordre pour les Transmissions.-

r-) Réseaux radio :

Interdiction absolue d'utiliser la T.S.F. sur les emplacements de départ.-

Autorisation d'émettre:

1°-dès le départ pour le guet aérien et en cas de rencontre avec l'ennemi,
2°-à partir de la transversale: TERNEUZEN - GAND - AUDENARDE pour tout le monde .-

c-) Contrôle-

Les émissions de tous les postes radio belges et hollandais seront interdites pour éviter toute indiscretion ou brouillage.-

Tout militaire surprenant une communication suspecte (fil ou radio) devra en rendre compte immédiatement à ses Chefs qui préviendront sans délai le 2° Bureau de la Division .-

VI/- MISE EN OEUVRE DES LIAISONS -:-

Les renseignements de passage° ou d'attaque des formations aériennes adverses seront recueillis et transmis conformément aux instructions de l'ordre particulier pour la D.C.A. è

Ils seront transmis en priorité D.C.A.

Priorité d'Opérations ...

Il est rappelé que la " Priorité d'Opérations n'est accordée qu'au Général Commandant la 1° D.L.M.

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DOCUMENT NO. 16

ORDRE D'OPERATIONS N°1.-

- COMPOSITION DU GROUPEMENT -

Trois Sous-Groupements :

- d'ASTAFORT/
- d'ARCOUES.
- VONDERHEYDEN.
- Une Réserve aux ordres du Commandant Michel de TOUCHET.
- Une Batterie de 25 de D.C.A. aux ordres directs du Commandant du Groupe.

II.- MISSION DU GROUPEMENT -

- Occuper WALCHEREN et SUD-BEVELAND avant l'arrivée de l'ennemi.
- Eventuellement l'en déloger.
- Tenir sur place et coûte que coûte, en attendant l'arrivée de l'infanterie.

Objectif principal : Ile de WALCHEREN avec, comme points essentiels :
 - FLESSINGUE, port et aérodrome.
 - Plan d'eau de VEURE.
 Villages de WESTKAPELLE - DOMBURG - VROUWEPOLDER et ARNEWUIDEN

Couverture face à l'Est : Canal de SUD-BEVELAND.
 Isthme et terrain d'aviation de WOENS-DRECHT.

VII.- INTENTION DU COMMANDANT DE GROUPEMENT -

- Gagner l'ennemi de vitesse en se portant d'un seul bond et sans souci d'alignement jusqu'à la rive Sud de l'ESCAUT-MARITIME (qui sera atteinte au maximum en 4 heures à partir du franchissement de la frontière Belge).
- Utiliser simultanément tous les moyens de passage (bacs - bateaux et isthme de WOKNELDRECHT).
- Appliquer le maximum de forces (7 escadrons) à WALCHEREN.
- Avec le reste, 2 escadrons (+ E.M.E.) tenir sans idée de repli le Canal de SUD-BEVELAND; le G.L. de Découverte étant chargé d'interdire aux engins blindés l'isthme de WOKNELDRECHT, et, si possible, l'usage du terrain d'aviation.
- Eviter d'une façon absolue l'éparpillement des forces.
- Dans chaque Sous-Groupement :
 - a) Surveiller le littoral.
 - b) Préparer des éléments mobiles d'intervention contre débarquement et parachutistes.
 - c) Tenir les bacs et les bases de ravitaillement de : BRESKENS - TESNEUZEN - WALSOORDEN.

EXECUTION -

1°) Sous-Groupement d'ASTAFORT (Ouest) :

- MISSION :- franchir l'ESCAUT-MARITIME à BRESKENS.
 - Occuper simultanément le port et l'aéroport de FLESSINGUE
 - Detachements de surveillance à WESTKAPELLE et à DOMBURG.

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A30 ALLIED INTRIGUE IN THE LOW COUNTRIES

- 2 -

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Moyens supplémentaires : Un escadron de Fusiliers Moto (Escadron de PEYERIMBOFF du 2^e U.R.C.A.) aux ordres du Colonel d'ASTAPORT à la sortie N. de FURNES. (route de MIEUPOORT).

2°) Sous-Groupement d'ARODES (Centre) :

MISSION : - Franchir l'ESCAUT-MARITIME à TER NEUZEN.
- Débarquer à BORSSSELEN (ou éventuellement à FLESSINGUE).
- Se porter sur l'Isthme Est d'ARNEMUIDEN.
- Occuper VEARRE (plan d'eau) - ARNEMUIDEN - et détachement de surveillance à VROUWEPOLDER.
- Assurer la liaison avec le Sous-Groupement d'ASTAPORT à MIDDELBURG.

Moyens supplémentaires : Néant.

3°) Sous-Groupement VONDERHEYDEN (Est) :

MISSION : - Franchir l'ESCAUT-MARITIME à WALSOOLEN.
- Débarquer à MANSVEERT.
- Tenir sans esprit de recul le Canal de SUD-BEVELAND.
- Pousser des moyens de feu sur l'Isthme de WOENSDRECHT afin d'assurer le passage du G.E. de Découverte, ~~arrivant~~ arrivant par ANVERS.
- Dès l'arrivée de ce G.E. de Découverte, l'utiliser pour interdire l'Isthme aux engins blindés et pour empêcher, si possible, l'utilisation par l'ennemi du terrain d'aviation de WOENSDRECHT.

Moyens supplémentaires :

- Un escadron de Fusiliers Moto (Escadron PICARD du 2^e G.R.C.A.).
- Un Groupe de canons de 85 (Groupe CHARVERIAT, du 2^e G.R.C.A.).
- Un peloton de Mitrailleurs Moto (Peloton CARON du 2^e G.R.C.A.).

Tous ces éléments aux ordres du Commandant VONDERHEYDEN, à la sortie Sud de DIXMUDE sur la route de BOKZINGE.

En outre, le Commandant VONDERHEYDEN réglera d'accord avec le Commandant LAMOINE la marche du G.E. de Découverte jusqu'à ST-NIKLAAS, et son utilisation à l'arrivée à WOENSDRECHT.

4°) Réserves :

- a) Aux ordres du Commandant Michel de TOUCHET.
 - Un escadron de Fusiliers Moto (Escadron JOUSLIN).
 - Un Groupe de Canons de 25 (Groupe MONTIGNY).
 - Un peloton de mitrailleurs moto (Peloton LELEU).
- b) Un batterie D.C.A. (Canons de 25).
Les éléments réservés suivront l'itinéraire N° 1 jusqu'à IJZENDIJKE, où ils recevront de nouveaux ordres.

V.- AXES DE MARCHES :

- Itinéraire N° 1 : Sous-Groupement d'ASTAPORT :

FURNES - OSTENDE - BROGHE Nord - OOSTBURG - BRESKENS.

- Itinéraire N° 2 : Sous-Groupement d'ARODES :

LOC - DIXMUDE Nord - TOMHOUT - BRUGES Sud - EKLOO - IJZENDIJKE - PHILIPPINE - TER NEUZEN.

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- Itinéraire N° 3 : Sous-Groupement VONDERHEYDEN :

POPBAINGE - BOEZINGE - MEBEN (en évitant DIJKHJDE) - LICHTERVELDE
 TIELT - DEINZE - GAND - ST. MIKLAAS - KEMZEKE - HULST - WALZORDE

Le G.E. de Découverte utilisera l'itinéraire 3 jusqu'à ST. MIK-
 LAAS, puis déboitera pour passer l'ESCAUT (Tunnel) à ANVERS (Itine-
 raire 3 bis). Il rejoindra par l'isthme de WOENSDRECHT.

VI.- TRANSVERSALE DE DEPART :

La frontière Belge, sera franchie à l'heure H qui sera fixée
 ultérieurement.

VII.- LIAISONS :

Dès l'ordre d'alerte, Un Officier de chaque Sous-Groupement (et
 en outre Un Officier du G.E. de Découverte) rendus à HONDSCHOOPE,
 avec moyens de Transmissions Motos.

VIII.- TRANSMISSIONS : Voir ordre particulier.

P.C. du Groupement LESTOQUOI.
 - Initialement : HONDSCHOOPE.
 - Intermédiaire : BRESKENS.
 - P.C. final : FLESSINGUE (port).

Axe de marche : Itinéraire N° 2 jusqu'à LJEKENDIJKE, puis : SCHOON-
 DIJKE - BRESKENS.

IX.- D. C. A.

Le Commandant de la Batterie de D.C.A. marchera de sa personne
 avec le Colonel LESTOQUOI, qu'il rejoindra à HONDSCHOOPE.
 Il se tiendra prêt à déployer une batterie au point de passage de
 de BRESKENS.
 Utilisation ultérieure : Défense du port de FLESSINGUE.

X.- MARINE - FORCES ARRIERES :

Protection du franchissement et du débarquement assurée d'après
 les ordres donnés directement par le Général Commandant l'ARMEE.

XI.- RAVITAILLEMENT - REPARATIONS :

Point de lère destination des différents éléments (ateliers - ci-
 ternes - T.R.) ligne générale : SLOIS - EKLOO - GAND (Sortie Sud).

XII.- SERVICE DE SANTE -

Evacuations sur DUNKERQUE.

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XIV.- DIVERS :

- Deux Compagnies d'infanterie doivent normalement être débarquées à FLESEINGUE (par la Marine et l'Aviation) avant l'arrivée du Groupement LESTOQUOI.
Leur absence éventuelle ne modifie en rien la mission du Groupement LESTOQUOI.
- Des éléments Hollandais et Belges (ces derniers arrivant par ANVERS) sont susceptibles de coopérer avec le Groupement LESTOQUOI et éviter les surprises.
- L'attitude avec la population civile doit être amicale mais ferme.
Après installation, les Commandants de Sous-Groupement iront venir auprès d'eux et conserveront en permanence un représentant qualifié des Bourgmestres les plus voisins. C'est à ce représentant qu'ils réclameront toutes les prestations nécessaires pour le Ravitaillement et la vie des troupes. Paiement, en principe, au comptant et en Florins.
Éventuellement, bons de réquisition.
- Se méfier de l'espionnage.

Le Lieutenant-Colonel LESTOQUOI
Commandant le Groupement
Signé : LESTOQUOI.

DOCUMENT NO. 17

SOUS-GROUPEMENT d'ASTAFORT.

P.C. BRAY-LUNES le 15 Novembre 1939

ORDRE D'OPERATIONS N° I. /

I - Situation générale)
 Mission) Voir Ordre d'Opérations N° I
 etc...) du Groupement.

II - Intention du Lieutenant-Colonel d'Astafort commandant le Groupement Ouest.

1°)- Porter en avant, dès le passage de la frontière une forte avant garde, qui se portera le plus vite possible sur BRESKENS, de manière à pouvoir s'embarquer sans délai et passer l'embouchure de l'Escaut sous la protection de l'aviation et occuper l'aéroport de FLESSINGUE.

2°)- Faire suivre le gros du G.R.D.I. en un dispositif largement articulé en profondeur et l'embarquer dès que l'opération du passage de l' A.G. aura réussi.

3°)- Occuper dès le premier débarquement l'aéroport de FLESSINGUE. A mesure de l'arrivée des nouveaux pelotons débarqués, pousser des éléments de surveillance vers DOMBURG, WESTKAPPELLE et prendre liaison à MIDDELBOUMG avec le détachement d' ARNEMUIDEN.

4°)- Assurer la couverture de la rive Sud à BRESKENS

III - DISPOSITIF -

a)- Avant Garde (2° Escadron Moto (Aux ordres
) I Peloton de Mitrailleuses) du Capitaine
 (I Groupe de 25 (des VILLETES.

Le 2° Escadron emènera : I Camionnette à vivres - *Tanlard*
 I Camionnette à munitions - *Platan*
 I Camionnette à essence - *Renault*
 I Camionnette de dépannage. *Le Roi*

b)- Gros (1° Escadron Moto (Aux ordres
) I Peloton de Mitrailleuses) du Capitaine
 (I Groupe de 25 (de MANGOU.

Le 1° Escadron emènera les mêmes voitures que le 2° Escadron.
ainsi que l' E. M. E

L' E. M. E. emènera les mêmes voitures, qui marcheront en queue du gros du G.M.D.I., sauf pour les munitions qui pourront être réparties entre l' A.G. et le gros.

(1° Escadron du G.R.C.A. qui prendra la queue du gros à
) la sortie Nord de FURNES.
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A34 ALLIED INTRIGUE IN THE LOW COUNTRIES

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c)- Le lieutenant-Colonel et le Peloton de Commandement marcheront entre l' A.G. et le gros.

d)- ECHELONNEMENT -

Entre l' A.G. et le gros : ~~12~~ ¹⁰ kilomètres.

Entre le gros (G.R.D.I. et l'Escadron du G.R.C.A. : 5 kilomètre

e)- DISPOSITIF EN FIN DE MARCHÉ -

L'Avant garde à BRÈSKENS où elle commencera son embarquement.

le gros { Eléments du G.R.D.I. : à ~~BRÈSKENS~~
Escadron du G.R.C.A. : à SCHOONDIJKE.

IV - ITINÉRAIRE :

Nieuwport
FURNES - OSTENDE - BRUGES Nord - OSTBOURG - BRÈSKENS.

V - POINT INITIAL -

Frontière Franco-Belge. sur la route de Furnes

Heure de Passage au P.I.

A. G. : Heure H
Gros : Heure H + 15"
T. R. : Heure H + 1"15

VI - EMBARQUEMENT -

Aura lieu sur des bacs.

A son arrivée à BRÈSKENS, l'A.G. embarquera aussitôt.

Lorsque l' A.G. aura atteint FLESSINGUE, le gros qui se sera porté sur BRÈSKENS embarquera à son tour.

Couverture de l'embarquement -

Par les pelotons de Mitrailleuses de l' A.G. et du gros, et par 1 peloton de l'Escadron du G.R.C.A. qui dès son arrivée à SCHOONDIJKE sera poussé directement sur BRÈSKENS.

Ce peloton sera, après le passage de tout le G.R.D.I., chargé de la garde de BRÈSKENS.

VII - D. C. A.

Au cours de la marche :

Dans chaque détachement { I Groupe en tête
I Groupe en queue.

Pendant le passage : Les Mitrailleuses en batterie sur le bac.

VIII -...../

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VIII - MISSION DU G.R.D.I. DES SON DEBARQUEMENT A FLESSINGHE.

L' A.G. se portera aussitôt à l'aéroport et s'y installera définitivement.

Il laissera un peloton et un G.M. au port de FLESSINGHE pour protéger le débarquement du gros.

Le gros se portera également à l'aéroport, et détachera :

- I Peloton de l'Escadron du G.R.C.A. à DOMBURG.
- I Peloton de l'Escadron du G.R.C.A. à WESTKAPFELLE.
- I Peloton de l'Escadron du G.R.C.A. à MIDDELBURG.

et prendra liaison avec le détachement d' ARNEMUIDEN.

IX - LIAISON -

Le Sous-Lieutenant KIPFER dans une touriste avec I side et I solo, seront, dès le déclenchement de l'alerte, envoyés à HONLSCHOOZE en liaison auprès du Groupement LESTOQUOI.

X - P.C. du Lieutenant-Colonel commandant le Sous-Groupement.

P.C. Initial : BRESKENS.

P.C. (après le débarquement) Gortie Nord de FLESSINGHE.

XI - TRANSMISSIONS -

Avec le P.C. du Colonel.

XII - I. R.

Ne dépassera pas ELUIS.

S'échelonnera en profondeur, en camouflant ses voitures.

XIII - SERVICE DE SANTE -

Marchera avec le P.C. du Colonel.

Le Lieutenant-Colonel d'ASTAFORT
Commandant le Sous-Groupement Ouest.



DOCUMENT NO. 18

G.R.D.I. 2
 GROUPE DE DECOUVERTE
 N° 2/0

P.C. le 17 AVRIL 1940

SECRET

ORDRE DE MOUVEMENT N° 2
 remplace et annule l'0/E°I du 12/4

- I° Situation Générale (p.m. 0/200/GR du 16/4
- II° Situation Particulière)
- III° MISSION DU G.R.
 Précédé d'un Groupe D.D. 6ème Cuir,
 1° Se porter en Direction Générale de BRUGES-ANVERS-GRUDA
 successivement sur les transversales :
 I° BRUGES - OOSTKAMP
 II° ANVERS - MALINES.
 A chacune de ces transversales ne repartir que sur ordre
 du Lt. Cl. Cdt. le G.R.
 II° En cas de rencontre avec l'Ennemi, l'attaquer
- IV° ITINERAIRES p.m. 0/209/G.R. du 16/4
 Haltes de 15 minutes faites automatiquement à l'heure
 pleine et paire (ravitaillement essence notes)
- V° DISPOSITION
 I° AVANT-GARDE aux O/ du Chef d'Escadron
 Côt le Découverte, et articulée comme suit :
 A) Escalier de tête I Fon A.M.D.
 aux O/ du Cap. Cdt I Fon MOTO (2ème Esc.
 1° Esc. A.M.D. Groupe Cdt Cap. A.M.D.
 I Fon A.M.D.
 I Fon MOTO (2ème Esc.
Côt AVANT GARDE P.C. Mobile Chef d'Escadron
 I E.R. 26Ter sur A.M.D.
- B) Escalier Réserve I Fon Mitrailleuses
 aux O/ Lt Cdt Fon I Groupe MOTO (Jalonneurs
 Mit. 1er Esc.
- 2° COLONEL Etat Major, Transmissions du G.R.D.I.
 Service de Santé
- 3° GROS aux O/ du Capitaine des Villettes et compo-
 sant :
 2 Pons A.M.D. T.C.I.A.M.D.
 2ème Esc. Moto-2 Pons
 1er Esc. Moto-1 Groupe T.C.I. Motos
 E.M.E.-1 Fon T.C.I.E.N.E. Sec Santé
 T.C. 2 et T. 3. aux O/ du Cap. Hubert derrière
 G.R.D.I. 12.
- VI° MISSION DE L'AVANT GARDE
 A) Se porter sur les transversales mentionnées au § III
 pour rechercher renseignements
 I° Sur les points de passage (en particulier à travers
 les positions BELGES du Canal Albert)

2)
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1° au 1334 (contact sur 1° ans de marche avec D.D. 60 Cuir
Pour déblayer la route
Pour couvrir Installation du Gros à ses arrêts aux diffé-
rents bonds.

- B) En cas de rencontre de l'ENNEMI, renseigner le Cl Cdt G.R. et attaquer.
En tout état de cause, couvrir l'installation des Gros sur les Objectifs atteints.

VII° EXECUTION DU MOUVEMENT.

- a) Point initial ()
b) Distances () p.m. °/808/G.R. du 15/4.
c) Vitesse de marche ()
d) HORAIRE

1° de jour :

Itinéraire	Distances	A.V. Garde	Tête du Gros	Observ.
Bray Dunes	-	H-35	H-15	
Honedchoote				
Frontière				
BELGE = P.I.	25	H+15	H+40	Halte au bivouac de 15' à l'arrivée à l'aube. Jeune (logement) à l'arrivée.
Oestkerque	25			
Pervijse	20	+55	+1.15 30	
Gistel	14	+1.25	+1.50	
Bruges	21	+2.05	+2.30	
Zeele	25	+2.55	+3.30	
Zelzate	22	+3.40	+4.00	Halte-casernes
Stakene	20			Stakene
Vrasene	20			
Anvers	15			
	185			Recommandation en voyage

de nuit :

Itinéraire	Distances	A.V. Garde	Tête du Gros	Observ.
Bray Dunes	-	H-35	H-1.50	
Honedchoote		2.15		
Frontière				
Belge = P.I.	25	H+ 15	H+ 40	
Oestkerque				
Pervijse	30	+ 2.15	+2.40	
Gistel	14	+3.45	+4.10	
Bruges	21	+5.45	+6.10	
Zeele	25	+8.15	+8.40	
Zelzate	22	+10.30	+10.55	Halte-casernes
Stakene	20			Stakene
Vrasene	20			
Anvers	15			
	125			

VX Liaisons et transmissions feront l'objet d'un ordre particulier

REMARQUES IMPORTANTES. Tous les éléments du G.R.D. 1.2 doivent être passés au Sud de la N.N. 30 pour 11.00 heures 40

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3)
.....

X* Ravitaillements

1° Vivres : Sur l'homme et au T.C.I des unités :
1 jour 1/3 vivres du jour
2 jours vivres de réserves
1 jour vivres supplémentaire
1 jour de vivres du T.R.

2° Essence: 4 Unités

Destinataires :

Capitaine Cdt A.M.D. (()
Capitaine Cdt Cème Ess.)
Capitaine Cdt E.M.E. (pour exécution
Chef de Corps à titre C.4.
Capitaine Cdt le Gros pr l'information

Le Chef d'Escadron Cdt le Groupe de
Découverte.



DOCUMENT NO. 19

TRADUCTION.

1 Annexe.

M E M O I R E .

Pour l'Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire
de Sa Majesté à Bruxelles.

Votre Excellence est priée, après avoir pris connaissance de ce mémoire, de se mettre immédiatement en rapport avec le Gouvernement belge, afin de porter à la connaissance de celui-ci, le contenu de ce Mémoire.

En attendant l'arrivée du Plénipotentiaire du Commandant en Chef des forces de terre et de Mer des Pays-Bas, Votre Excellence peut annoncer au Gouvernement belge, que l'armée néerlandaise a mission de retarder la marche en avant de l'envahisseur autant que possible et dès la frontière.

La direction de l'armée néerlandaise a pris en sérieuse considération de faire présenter une énergique résistance dans la partie nommée Peel-Raaiststelling dans le Nord-Brabant (de Weert sur Nederweert-Meyel-Helenaveen-Orientdsveem et Mill vers Grave) par les troupes qui sont sur place, et a fait édifier d'importants travaux pour mettre cette position en mesure de répondre à pareille exigence. Elle doit cependant reconnaître le fait que elle n'a pu faire des préparatifs contre une invasion allemande seulement sur le territoire néerlandais et que l'importance de la position organisée à cet endroit dépend non seulement du pouvoir défensif et ses préparatifs mais aussi est commandée dans une large mesure par la possibilité d'être tourné par le Sud, donc à Weert et par l'ouest de cette ville.

Etant donné que le commandement de l'armée a placé le gros de ses troupes au Canal Albert, tandis que d'après ce que le commandement de l'armée hollandaise croit savoir, il n'y a que de très faibles troupes avec une mission de retardement qui se trouvent à la Meuse et au Zuid-Willemsvaart, le Commandant en Chef néerlandais estime que la possibilité d'un passage des

forces allemandes au delà de Weert e.o. vers 't Bois le Duc est si grande qu'il s'est vu obligé à son profond regret de ramener le gros des troupes installé dans le Nord-Brabant tout en laissant des arrières-gardes, au Nord de la Meuse et du Waal.

Le Commandant en Chef néerlandais prie Votre Excellence de vouloir bien attirer l'attention du Gouvernement belge avec insistance sur le fait que tout a été fait du côté néerlandais pour fortifier de telle manière la position Weert-Grave déjà nommée et pour l'organiser de telle façon que le Commandement de l'armée belge d'après l'opinion du Commandant en chef néerlandais peut avoir toute confiance dans l'appui que cette position quand à elle peut offrir.

Le Commandement de l'armée néerlandaise caressait donc l'espoir que la résistance principale de la Belgique serait offerte sur la Meuse et le Zuid-Willemsvaart, donc la direction générale d'Eben-Emael à Bocholt.

Le fait que le commandement de l'armée belge n'a pas souhaité manifestement cette jonction force le commandant en chef néerlandais de procéder à une mesure qu'il déplore extrêmement. L'armée néerlandaise offrira une sérieuse résistance sur la ligne de Grebbe (de l'Ijsselmeer au dessus d'Amersfoort et Rhénen jusqu'au Waal près Ochten), cette ligne sera protégée au flan sud par une ligne de Ochten à la Mer du Nord; de Ochten à Tiel derrière le Waal,

de Tiel aux inondations du Vesting Holland derrière la Linge et ensuite dans le groupe Merwede et dans le sud du Vesting Holland,

En outre, la Zélande sera défendue avec ~~acharnement~~ ^{acharnement}.

La mesure dans laquelle l'armée néerlandaise pourra se maintenir dans les lignes susnommées en Zélande dépend entre autre de la force des troupes allemandes d'invasion, et de l'aide qui sera offerte du côté français et anglais.

Les plans de commandement de l'armée néerlandaise seront exposés par le fondé de pouvoirs, du Commandant en chef néerlandais.

3.

Je prie Votre Excellence de vouloir dès à présent faire part au Gouvernement belge avec insistance, de ce que les lignes susnommées et les positions en Zélande sont organisées et occupées de façon telle que si les troupes franco-anglaises venant au secours pouvaient être sur place rapidement, que une résistance acharnée pourrait être offerte à cet endroit.

Si cette aide devant tarder la possibilité devra alors être envisagée - étant donné la longueur des lignes déjà nommées et la nécessité d'opérer la relève par suite de la longue durée de la guerre de ramener les troupes néerlandaises dans le Vesting Holland; Le commandant de l'armée néerlandaise a indiqué avec insistance aux Gouvernements français et anglais qu'il regretterait vivement cela tant du pur point de vue néerlandais que du point de vue international. Il a attiré l'attention sur le fait que la défense de la Grebbelinie laisse ouverte la possibilité de sortir à un moment donné de cette ligne pour procéder à une attaque tandis que l'isolement des troupes dans les Grebbelinies exige plus de forces de la part de l'adversaire que l'isolement du Vesting Holland.

Il n'est pas nécessaire d'insister plus longuement sur l'intérêt du maintien de la frontière de Zélande. Il est demandé à la France de tenir à la disposition un corps d'armée de 4 divisions comme réserve pour la défense du coeur du pays.

Au Gouvernement anglais il est demandé de mettre à la disposition :

a) une division soutenue par des forces de combat aériennes et des moyens de protection aérienne pour la défense de la Zélande.

b) des forces de combat aériennes et des moyens de protection aérienne pour la défense du coeur du pays.

.....

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4.

De plus il demandé aux deux Gouvernements s'ils sont disposés - sur demande- de mettre en action des escadres de bombardement contre les ponts que les Allemands jeteront sur la Meuse et l'Yssel.

Enfin je vous prie de faire savoir au Gouvernement belge que si le commandement de l'armée alliée pouvait décider de placer des troupes importantes dans le Nord-brabant, le Commandement de l'armée néerlandaise de son côté pourrait envisager la possibilité - d'après le développement de la situation au nord de la Meuse - de faire intervenir une partie de son armée côte à côte avec les forces belges, -c.q anglaises - et françaises dans ces provinces.

Aussi longtemps que le fondé de pouvoir du Commandant en chef des armées de terre et de l'air néerlandaises ne s'est pas rendu près de vous, c'est l'attaché militaire adjoint à Bruxelles qui remplit ce rôle.

Pour sa sécurité veuillez recevoir ci-joint une enveloppe scellée que vous pouvez lui remettre en mains propres et par laquelle l'attaché militaire en question recevra la mission d'être fondé de pouvoir .

's Gravenhague 23 Maart 1940

De General,

Opperbevelhebber Van Land-en Zeemacht

H.G.Winkelman.

DOCUMENT NO. 20

SECRET.
APPENDIX A

Issued with AVONFORCE O.O. No. 1.

ROLE OF AVONFORCE WHILST IN NORWAY.

Role.

1. The task of AVONFORCE is initially to secure the port of NARVIK and the railway to the SWEDISH frontier. While the force remains in NORWAY, its role is to provide for the security of the port, and of the railway against attack by German forces from SWEDEN, and sabotage or other action by local hostile elements.

If opportunity offers, the Commander intends to advance into SWEDEN and occupy the GALLIVARE ore fields and important centres in that area. On no account will armed forces advance across the frontier without express orders from Force H.Q.

Considerations affecting the defensive measures necessary in NORWAY are dealt with below.

Possible enemy action.

2. Under the most favourable circumstances, (to Germany), the concentration of two German divisions in the GALLIVARE area early in May is possible, followed about a month later by two or three more divisions.

3. The distance from GALLIVARE to the NORWEGIAN frontier is 62 miles. Communications consist of a single electric line and a motor road as far as KIRUNA.

There is no road from the NORWEGIAN frontier to NARVIK. Under existing conditions, it is possible for a lightly-equipped force to operate between GALLIVARE and the frontier, but the main German advance must be astride the railway unless and until other communications are developed. /Under.....

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Under favourable circumstances, German forces might be expected to make contact with AVONFORCE on the frontier towards the end of May, after which pressure might increase progressively.

While local reconnaissance is essential before reaching definite conclusions, it is believed that the difficult nature of the country about the frontier and in NORWAY itself may make military operations on any scale difficult for the enemy. Effective defensive action should not be difficult, subject to the improvement of communications

4. No action by the Russian Air Force is envisaged, although some use of Russian aerodromes by Germany (e.g. OHTUA or KANDALAKSKA) cannot be excluded. Air action from Germany, except on a very limited scale, is not possible owing to the distances involved. A light scale of attack is possible from the end of April by squadrons using SWEDISH aerodromes.

Should, however, a German force be established at the head of the GULF OF BOTHNIA, aircraft could be operated from aerodromes in that area.

Effective air action is unlikely before early June. From then on, an ever-increasing scale of attack is possible. While the scale of attack on the NARVIK area is unlikely to approach that to be anticipated on the Western Front, active defence, dispersion, and proper P.A.D. measures are important.

Norwegian Army

5. NARVIK is the Headquarters of the 15th Infantry Regiment consisting of three battalions. Troops in NARVIK itself are believed to number about 1500.

Most of the available accommodation and M/T at NARVIK are reported to have been commandeered by the Army.

/6.

- 3 -

6. In peace, the following are located at HARSTAD, 35 miles N.W. of NARVIK:-

Headquarters, 6th Division.

One Artillery Battalion.

One Engineer Battalion.

Troops can always be moved to NARVIK by coastal boats from HARSTAD at short notice.

7. An infantry regiment is normally located at TROMSO, 95 miles north of NARVIK, where there is also a seaplane station.

8. Although it may be assumed that no opposition will be met with from NORWEGIAN armed forces, as a normal measure of military security, the possibility of hostile action cannot be disregarded. Plans must therefore be made on this basis. If the active and effective co-operation of the NORWEGIAN forces can be secured, it should be possible to reduce considerably the number of AVONFORCE troops who would otherwise be required for internal security, coast-watching, and other duties.

The defence of NORWEGIAN naval and military establishments should normally be left to their own garrisons, unless our assistance is necessary and acceptable.

Civil Population.

9. Whether or not the reception of AVONFORCE is friendly, certain hostile elements will have to be reckoned with. There is a German population in NARVIK, and a Communist element. Either may attempt, by sabotage or otherwise, to hinder operations. Provision must therefore be made for the protection of vulnerable points on the railway and in NARVIK itself.

NARVIK.

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NARVIK.

10. Three or four small calibre guns (3- or 4-inch) are reported to be located on the high ground above the ORE QUAY.

There is a high wireless mast in the same area.

A number of A.A. guns have been reported.

There also appears to be a small fortified post on the rock behind the RAILWAY QUAY.

11. The most important points which will require protection in NARVIK against sabotage are:-

(a) The quays.

(b) Railway and rolling stock.

(c) The power stations:-

NYGAARDS - 8 miles E.N.E.

HAADVIKDAL - 3 miles S.

NARVIK - British Company's reserve Diesel Plant.

12. In addition to the above, the following may also require protection:-

(a) The naval and military W/T stations communicating with the United Kingdom. These may be located on the high ground north of the ORE QUAY.

(b) Military base stocks of supplies, petrol, and ammunition.

Railway.

13. The length of railway between NARVIK and the frontier is 23 miles. It is said to be prepared for demolition at several points, but there is no precise information about this.

Owing to the fact that the railway clings to the side of precipices, and has numerous tunnels and frequent spots where

/large.....

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large masses of rock overhang it, the possibility of damaging the line seriously is unlimited.

14. Tunnels and bridges are said to be guarded by NORWEGIAN troops, but it is probable that this is not being actively carried out.

15. The protection of the railway to the maximum extent possible is vital for the future operations of the force. It will therefore probably be necessary to locate detachments at four or five points along the line to provide guards and patrols. Strengths and locations must depend on reconnaissance and the extent of co-operation by NORWEGIAN troops in protecting the line.

16. Although the railway, generally speaking, is vulnerable throughout, certain demolitions might take months to repair, while others might be cleared in perhaps a week or so. In the first instance, technical reconnaissance and a sense of proportion will be of the first importance.

Demolitions

The export of ore from NARVIK must be continued as long as possible. The execution of demolitions will therefore be guided by this consideration.

Troops available.

17. The force available at various stages to carry out the defensive role given in para. 1 will be:-

- (a) If the 1st Convoy is limited to one personnel ship -
one infantry battalion (1st Scots Guards).
- (b) If the 1st Convoy consists of two personnel ships -
two infantry battalions (1st Scots Guards and
2nd South Wales Borderers) and 3 Lt. A.A.
Bty. battery / (c)



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- 6 -

- (c) After arrival of 2nd Convoy - 24 Inf. Bde. and
3 Bde A.A. Blys. Batteries.

Responsibility for Defence:

18. Until further troops are available, 24 Inf. Bde. must
be responsible for :-

- (a) Reconnaissance and defence of the frontier against
enemy ground attack from SWEDEN.
(b) The security of NARVIK and the railway to the frontier.

The first task will be reconnaissance of the railway
and frontier and the security of NARVIK for the landing of
troops and stores.

19. 3 Lt. A.A. Battery will be sited to protect NARVIK and
the harbour in conjunction with N.C. 1/c.

War Office.

6th April, 1940.



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